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Buddhist Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 
Thinking about ‘Thoughts without a Thinker’
william S. Waldron
For there is suffering, but none who suffers; Doing exists although there is no doer. 
Extinction is but no extinguished person; Although there is a path, there is no goer.
—Visuddh im agga
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein
We are but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water. We are not stuff that 
abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves.
—Norbert Wiener
UDWIG Wittgenstein has succinctly expressed what became one of the
J—/central challenges of Indian Buddhist thought:
One of the most misleading representational techniques in our lan­
guage is the use of the word ‘I,’ particularly when it is used in rep­
resenting immediate experience, as in ‘I can see a red patch.’ It 
would be instructive to replace this way of speaking by another in 
which immediate experience would be represented without using 
the personal pronoun.1
Indian Buddhist philosophy addresses the same issue, but for the purpose of 
liberating sentient beings from such ‘misleading’ notions as an ‘I,’ and our
* Much of the research for this paper was carried out under a grant from the Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Science, and with the generous assistance of Otani University. I would 
also like to thank the following scholars for their comments and criticisms of the seemingly 
endless series of drafts of this essay: David Carpenter, Jeff Dunham, David Germano, Leslie 
Kawamura, Miyashita Seiki, Robert Morrison, John Spackman, and Dale Wright.
1 Wittgenstein 1975, p. 88.
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bondage to the world of repetitive behavioral patterns—i.e., samsara—that 
such misconceptions entail. To this end, Buddhist philosophy attempts to 
articulate not only how we can usefully speak about immediate experience 
without reference to internal subjects (atmari), but also how we can account 
for the genesis of this ‘world of experience’ without recourse to supernatur­
al agencies. These two notions, that of no-self (anatmari) and the dependent 
arising of the world (pratitya-samutpada) through its own interactive proc­
esses alone, are arguably the most distinctive features of the traditional 
Indian Buddhist world-view. Yet as any teacher of Buddhism knows, these 
ideas, and their subtle implications, seem extraordinarily difficult to compre­
hend. We are so bound by our ingrained notions of selves, substances and 
entities that denying them seems to defy common sense.
One of the great ironies of comparative philosophy is that most modem 
people already think in such terms in certain contexts: as a matter of course, 
most scientific accounts of causality lack anthropomorphic agents altogeth­
er. Such phenomena as gravity, chemical reactions, even most biological 
processes, are normally understood in terms of complex yet orderly patterns 
of interaction and organization which occur ‘by themselves,’ bereft of either 
external controlling agents or internal experiencing subjects. Analyzing 
human experience in such purely impersonal terms, however, seems to pre­
clude the very dimension of immediate experience we seek to understand 
since it excludes from the outset notions of selfhood and subjectivity, the 
apparent sine qua non of experience itself. That is, while science is quite 
capable of discussing the world without a maker, it is still searching for 
appropriate ways of discussing thoughts without a thinker. Fortunately, 
Indian Buddhist analyses of mind are already expressed in a philosophical 
language which avoids the postulation of experiential subjects without di­
minishing the importance of the experiential dimension—a language which 
therefore provides rich opportunities for dialogue with scientific approaches 
to understanding mind. This is possible because there is a growing consensus 
in Western thought and science that we may understand ourselves and our 
world more deeply if we think in terms of patterns of relationships rather 
than of reified essences or entities—if we think, in short, in terms of depen­
dent arising.
This essay explores such possibilities by focusing upon two core concepts, 
the dependent arising of our ‘world of experience,’ and the notion of vijhana, 
‘discerning cognitive awareness’ or simply ‘consciousness,’ ultimately ar­
riving at their critical confluence in the Yogacara concept of the alaya- 
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vijnana, a form of subliminal cognitive awareness that serves as the ‘uncon­
scious structuring of the world.’ We will draw upon ideas from such modem 
fields as general systems theory, evolutionary biology and cognitive science 
in order to elucidate these ancient notions, resulting in provocatively differ­
ent, yet to our mind more evocatively contemporary, interpretations of these 
key Buddhist concepts. Rather than pursue a simple point-by-point compar­
ison between these traditions, however, we seek to draw out their common­
alities by engaging in an inductive, almost phenomenological inquiry into 
the possibilities of speaking about experience ‘without using the personal 
pronoun.’ This approach, perforce, focuses upon thematic, even phenomeno­
logical, coherency at the expense, we are aware, of historical particularity.
To anticipate both the argument and structure of this essay, we will focus 
on a number of areas where Indian Buddhist thought converges with current 
trends in scientific approaches to mind: (I) They both focus on patterns of 
dependent relationships rather than on actions of independent entities, (II) 
within which cognitive awareness (vijnana) is understood as a process which 
arises in dependence upon conditions, rather than a faculty which acts by 
cognizing objects. (Ill) Cognitive awareness arises, moreover, triggered by 
differences within a circumscribed cognitive domain, rather than as the per­
ception of objects within a pre-existing external world. (IV) These cognitive 
domains have arisen through processes of circular causality (feedback sys­
tems), brought about in large part by those very discernments of differences.
(V) Such differences themselves only arise within a larger classificatory 
context, through unconscious processes pre-formed by linguistic categories 
rather than through conscious processes performing rational procedures.
(VI) This Tinguistification’ of human mental processes gives rise to a sym­
bolic self, arising out of the reflexive possibilities of language rather than 
reflecting the existence of substantive souls. (VII) Finally, the notion of a 
‘cognitive unconscious’ epitomizes all of the above points: it develops 
through evolutionary processes of circular causality, which give rise to forms 
of awareness without an experiencing subject, by means of which our world 
of experience is continuously yet unconsciously mapped, classified and con­
structed. This unconscious structuring of experience, both perspectives sub­
mit, imparts the cogency of human experience, with its deep sense of 
subjective coherence, without relying upon essential or substantive causal 
agents, either external or internal. In this way, at least some Buddhist 
thinkers and some modem scientists have reached some consensus on ways 
to think about ‘Thoughts without a Thinker.’
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I. The ‘Dependent Arising of the World’ as Phenomenology of Experience 
The classical Indian Buddhist conception of causality2 is singularly ex­
pressed in the simple formula of dependent arising:
2 This is, unavoidably, a generalization. There were numerous schools which often dif­
fered in their interpretations of dependent arising. We seek to express here an equitable com­
mon ground.
3 There are many passages in the Pali texts such as the following: “ ‘Who, now, Lord, is it 
who craves?’ ‘Not a fit question,’ said the Exalted One. I am not saying [someone] craves. If 
I were saying so, the question would be a fit one. But I am not saying so. And I not saying so, 
if you were to ask thus: ‘Conditioned now by what, Lord, is craving?’ this were a fit question. 
And the fit answer there would be: ‘Conditioned by feeling is craving’ ” (S II 13).
When this is, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. 
When this is not, that does not come to be; with the cessation of 
this, that ceases. (M II 32)
This basic formula, ‘when X is, Y arises,’ states that certain conditions (X) 
are the generative matrix within which other conditions (Y) come to be. 
Whatever exists comes about dependent upon its enabling conditions and 
persists as long as such conditions persist. The Indian Buddhists observed 
that we can best understand complex causality—how things come to be—by 
understanding the systemic relations in which they are embedded and the 
patterns of dependence upon which they arise, that is, their ‘dependent aris­
ing.’ As we shall see, this formula subsequently became the basis for a model 
of circular causality in which certain specific patterns of conditions feedback 
upon themselves, reinforcing their own evolutionary processes. Within this 
deceptively simple formula, however, lies much of the distinctive Buddhist 
vision of the world, some of whose implications the remainder of this essay 
will attempt to draw out.
One of its most important implications is that it dispenses with the notion 
of fixed entities or unchanging essences altogether. Instead of asking how 
independent entities act within or upon an objective world, the view of de­
pendent arising asks “under what conditions does such and such a phenome­
non arise?,” or, more elaborately, “what complex of conditions operates in 
what recurrently patterned ways in order to typically give rise to what kind 
of phenomena?”3 This is akin to shifting one’s perspective from that of the 
audience enthralled with the personal drama on stage to that of the crew con­
cerned with the supporting operations backstage. In other words, our atten­
tion on independent agents acting upon independent objects, the entrenched 
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grammatical syntax of conventional language,4 is turned toward an investi­
gation of the complex, processual and interactive arising of things. But this 
focuses our attention upon patterns of arising rather than on actions of 
agents; and patterns are relational, not substantive, and arising is dynamic, 
not static. The Buddhist dismissal of selves, essences or unchanging entities, 
therefore, does not arise from logical propositions derived from first princi­
ples, such as ‘all is change,’ as much as it follows from the form of the ques­
tion being raised, “how do things come to be?”5—a point which is all the 
more obvious by a similar disavowal of essences,6 entities or substantive 
selves7 in modem science.
This is the conceptual framework, the causal syntax if you will, within 
which most earlier Buddhist analyses of mind took place. It is an approach to 
describing and understanding experience as it arises. It is, in a word, a phe-
4 See Stem 1995, p. 79f: “In the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein... maintains that the 
subject-predicate grammar of our everyday language has such a firm grip on us that we are 
usually quite unaware of its influence. Because the grammar of ordinary language has been 
shaped by the need to successfully manipulate our environment. . . , we usually understand 
experience in subject-predicate terms: we say such things as ‘I have a headache’ and take it 
for granted that the term T refers to a subject, the self.”
5 Since, by definition, essences do not change, they can have no obvious causal effect in 
the world of change; an unmoving billiard ball does not cause another ball to move, only a 
moving one does. Essences are therefore metaphysical notions unrelated to the endeavor to 
understand causality in the phenomenal world. In slightly different terms, Wittgenstein sug­
gests that “a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the 
mechanism” (Philosophical Investigations, #271).
6 Gombrich (1996, p. If) cites Karl Popper’s remarks on the non-essentialism and nomi­
nalism of modem science: “Popper, 1952, vol. II, p. 14: ‘the scientific view of the definition 
“A puppy is a young dog” would be that it is an answer to the question “ What shall we call a 
young dog?” rather than an answer to the question “ What is a puppy?” (Questions like “ What 
is life?” or “What is gravity?” do not play any role in science.) The scientific use of defini­
tions . . . may be called its nominalist interpretation, as opposed to its Aristotelian or essen- 
tialist interpretation. In modern science, only nominalist definitions occur, that is to say, 
shorthand symbols or labels are introduced in order to cut a long story short.’ Popper, 1974: 
20: . . essentialism is mistaken in suggesting that definitions can add to our knowledge of
facts . . .’ ”
7 Many, if not most, scientific works on brain and consciousness reject the notion of a 
“unified, freely acting agent.” For example, brain scientist Richard Restak (1994, pp. 120-21) 
argues: “Brain research on consciousness carried out over the past two decades casts impor­
tant doubts on our traditional ideas about the unity and indissolubility of our mental lives,” 
particularly “the concept of ourself as a unified, freely acting agent directing our behavior.” 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 268): “The very way that we normally conceptualize our inner 
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nomenology of consciousness. In order to appreciate this perspective and its 
larger implications for Buddhist philosophies of mind, we will examine the 
arising of vijnana, of ‘discerning cognitive awareness,’ or simply, con­
sciousness.
II. The Dependent Arising of Cognitive Awareness
World and perceiver specify each other.
—Francisco Varela, et. al., The Embodied Mind
Classical Buddhist analysis of mind dissects phenomenal experience into its 
basic constituents, each of which, consonant with the view of dependent aris­
ing, arises in dependence upon other causes and conditions. This is well 
exemplified in the concept of vijnanct (P. vinnana), ‘cognitive awareness’ or 
‘consciousness,’ the central most concept in Buddhist understanding of 
mind. Although the Buddha8 declared in general that “Apart from condi­
tions, there is no arising of cognitive awareness” (M I 258), each specific 
form of cognitive awareness arises in conjunction with particular factors: 
“Visual cognitive awareness arises dependent on the eye and (visual) form” 
(S II 73). That is, when an object appears in a sense-field, impinging upon its 
respective sense organ, a moment of cognitive awareness (vijnanaj arises.9 
Sense-object and sense organ (or faculty) are thus correlatively defined: a 
visual object, by definition, is that kind of stimulus which can impinge upon 
an eye. The same is true for all six modes of human cognitive awareness: 
visual-, auditory-, olfactory-, gustatory-, tactile-, and mental-cognitive 
awareness. All arise depending upon the concomitance of their respective 
organs (or faculties), the five senses and mind,10 with their corresponding 
classes of stimuli.
lives is inconsistent with what we know scientifically about the nature of mind. In our system 
for conceptualizing our inner lives, there is always a Subject that is the locus of reason and 
that metaphorically has an existence independent of the body. As we have seen, this contra­
dicts the fundamental findings of cognitive science.”
8 There are serious historical questions concerning whether or to what extent the discours­
es preserved in the Pali Canon represent the actual words of the Buddha. As these questions 
do not directly affect the import of this paper, we provisionally accede to their traditional attri­
bution to the Buddha.
9 Ml 190: “When internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and 
there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding 
class of consciousness” (Nanamoli 1995, p. 284).
10 We will return to the seemingly anomalous category of mental cognitive awareness 
below.
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Cognitive awareness (vijnana) is, moreover, a result of discernment. 
Vijnana is commonly defined in Abhidharma-era texts as “the discrete dis­
cernment [of sense-objects],”11 a definition emphasizing the disjunctive 
sense that the prefix ‘vz-’ (cognate with Latin ‘dis-’)12 lends to the verbal root 
fna,' ‘to know.’ We will return to this sense of discernment shortly.
Although it is common to speak of cognitive awareness as if it actively 
cognizes objects, in the syntax of dependent arising cognitive awareness 
does not actually cognize anything—it simply is the awareness which arises 
when the requisite conditions come together.13 Vasubandhu, author of the 
fifth-century Abhidharma-kosa, makes precisely this point:
The sutra teaches: “By reason of the organ of sight and of visible 
matter there arises the visual consciousness”: there is not there 
either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not 
there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a 
play of cause and effect. In the light of [common] practice, one 
speaks, metaphorically, of this process: “The eye sees, and the 
consciousness discerns.” But one should not cling to these met­
aphors.14
11 Abhiclharma-kosa 1.16 (Poussin, tome 1, p. 30): vijnana prativijhapti. Yogacarabhumi 
(Tib. 189b 4f) has a similar definition: mam par shes pa ni yul so sor mam par rig pa’i 
mtshan nyid gang yin pa’o. Perhaps the most common definition is “[one] cognizes [or dis­
cerns], therefore it is called cognitive awareness” (M I 292: vijandti ti kho tasmd vihhdnan ti 
vuccati). In his Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajhapdramita Literature (1967, p. 352), 
Conze lists the following: vi-janana, being aware, rnam par rig pa; vi-janati, is aware, 
becomes aware of; vijanite, discerns, become aware of; vi-jha, discerning, rig-pa; vijhdpti, 
information; vijhata, be aware of, cognized, discerned, known, ses-pa, rnam par ses-pa; 
vijnana, rnam par ses-pa, consciousness; vijhdyate, discern, ses; vijheya, ses-par bya, dis­
cernible, distinct.
12 Thus, the standard translation of ‘vi-’ into Tibetan is ‘rnam’, ‘different, distinct, individ­
ual’ (Das, p. 757) and into Hsiian Tsang’s Chinese is ‘fen ft,’ to divide, share, separate, dis­
tinguish’ (Mathews’ CED, p. 269, #1851).
13 As Rahula points out, “Consciousness does not recognize an object. It is only a sort of 
awareness—awareness of the presence of an object” (Rahula 1959, p. 23). Milinda’s Ques­
tions: “Because there are vision here and material shape, sire, visual consciousness arises. Co- 
nascent with that are sensory impingement, feeling, perception, volition, one-pointedness, the 
life-principle, attention—thus these things are produced from a condition and no experiencer 
is got at here” (Miln. 78 [56]).
14 Pruden, vol. 1, p. 118. Buddhaghosa similarly states in the Visuddhimagga (XIX, 20): 
“He sees no doer over and above the doing, no experiencer of the result over and above the 
occurrence of the result. But he sees clearly with right understanding that the wise say ‘doer’ 
when there is doing and ‘experiencer’ when there is experiencing simply as a mode of com­
mon usage.”
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To ‘cling to the metaphors’ of agents and actions—as if, for example, hear­
ing were listening and seeing were watching—obscures the radically deper­
sonalized model of mind expressed by the notion of no-self (anatman). In 
other words, to interpret vijfiana as an act of cognition rather than an occur­
rence of cognitive awareness is to ignore the syntax of dependent arising, 
which takes no active subject. Once again, the traditional Buddhist denial of 
a substantive, unchanging entity may be seen as less a metaphysical position 
than a function of its mode of analysis.15 Cognitive awareness is not some­
thing ‘someone’ does. Like an act of nature, cognitive awareness happens.
15 Wittgenstein’s attempt to forge a subjectless language entailed similar consequences: “It 
is because a language designed for the sole function of expressing everything that a subject 
might experience has no need for a term designating that subject that one cannot refer to the 
subject of experience from within the phenomenological language . . . From within, one can­
not individuate a subject at all. The metaphysical subject is not an object of experience, but a 
way of indicating the overall structure of experience . . . The grammar of the phenomenolog­
ical language ensures that all statements about experience are expressed in the same—owner­
less—way” (Stem 1995, p. 84).
16 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 24f: “Color concepts are ‘interactional’; they arise from 
the interactions of our bodies, our brains, the reflective properties of objects, and electromag­
netic radiation. Colors are not objective; there is in the grass or the sky no greenness or blue­
ness independent of retinas, color cones, neural circuitry, and brains. Nor are colors purely 
subjective; they are neither a figment of our imaginations nor spontaneous creations of our 
brains . . . Rather, color is a function of the world and our biology interacting.”
This entails a number of important implications. Cognition, in these terms, 
is neither purely subjective nor wholly objective. Like a transaction that 
takes place between individuals, cognitive awareness occurs at the interface, 
the concomitance, of a sense organ and its correlative stimulus. Cognitive 
awareness is thus neither an exact ‘mirror of nature’ which reflects things ‘as 
they are’—since what constitutes an ‘object’ is necessarily defined by the 
capacities of a particular sense organ; nor is it a unilateral projection of a pri­
ori categories—since the cognitive capacities of a sense organ are also cor- 
relatively defined by the kinds of stimuli that may impinge upon it. In other 
words, the ‘subjective’ sense organs and ‘objective’ stimuli necessarily func­
tion in relation to, and are only intelligible in terms of, each other.16
On the one hand, this is just common sense, and nearly tautological: of 
course perception is based upon our means of cognition. We can only per­
ceive what we can discern, and what we can discern depends upon our means 
of perception. On the other hand, the implications of this relational view of 
cognition continue unfolding as we continue asking that quintessential 
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Buddhist question: under what conditions does discerning cognitive aware­
ness arise? For discerning cognitive awareness is not only an event that 
occurs temporally, but one which equally depends upon relational distinc­
tions—and relational distinctions are hardly substances. Following the im­
plications of such ‘insubstantial discernment,’ our epistemology based upon 
dependent arising begins to get slippery indeed.
III. The Dependent Arising of Awareness (vijnana) of Difference
Perception operates only on difference. All receipt of information is necessarily the 
receipt of news of difference.
—Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature
We know we are entering a different view of the world when we read the fol­
lowing statement in an early Buddhist text:
The eye, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does 
not remain in any place. In this way, the eye exists after having 
been non-existent and, after having existed, disappears.17
17 Paramartha-simyata-sutra (Samyukta, T 2. 92cl6). As quoted in the Abhidharmakosa, 
ad AKBh V 27b (Poussin, tome 4, p. 59; Pruden, vol. 3, p. 814).
Such passages call out for clarification, and not only for those unfamiliar 
with Buddhist thought. And yet, as we shall see, these notions follow quite 
logically from the basic perspective of dependent arising.
I will use the analyses of Gregory Bateson, biologist, cyberneticist, and 
anthropologist, to enter into the subtle implications of an epistemology based 
upon dependent arising—from the idea that all phenomena are necessarily in 
flux, to the airy notion that not only do they neither exist nor not exist but that 
their discernment necessarily depends upon insubstantial classificatory grids 
or ‘mapping.’ In his popular book, Mind and Nature, Bateson analyzes cog­
nitive processes by comparing them to a simple electric switch:
[T]he switch, considered as a part of an electric circuit, does not 
exist when it is in the on position. From the point of view of the cir­
cuit, it is not different from the conducting wire which leads to it 
and the wire which leads away from it. It is merely ‘more conduc­
tor.’ Conversely, but similarly, when the switch is off, it does not 
exist from the point of view of the circuit. It is nothing, a gap 
between two conductors which themselves exist only as conduc­
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tors when the switch is on. In other words, the switch is not except 
at the moments of its change of setting, and the concept ‘switch’ 
has thus a special relation to time. It is related to the notion 
‘change ’ rather than to the notion 'object. ’
Sense organs, as we have already noted, admit only news of dif­
ference and are indeed normally triggered only by change, i.e., by 
events or by those differences in the perceived world which can be 
made into events by moving the sense organ. In other words, the 
end organs of sense are analogous to switches. They must be 
turned ‘on’ for a single moment by external impact. That single 
moment is the generating of a single impulse in the afferent 
nerve.18
18 Bateson 1979, p. 121; emphasis added in the last three cases.
19 In his Philosophical Remarks (#54), Wittgenstein makes the following remark: “What 
belongs to the essence of the world cannot be expressed by language. For this reason, it can­
not say that all is in flux. Language can only say those things we can also imagine otherwise.” 
We take Stem’s comments on this passage as admonitory qualification for many of the points 
that follow in this essay: “Like the solipsistic sayings, ‘the world is my world’ and ‘only the 
present experience has reality,’ Wittgenstein regards ‘all is in flux’ as a philosophical pseudo­
proposition, an attempt to say the unsayable .. . But saying that we can’t imagine it being oth­
erwise is to rule out the possibility that the proposition is false, and in so doing we also 
eliminate the connection between language and world that gives the proposition its sense.” 
(Stem 1995, p. 162). These ‘solipsistic sayings,’ in other words, may be constitutive condi­
tions for what we can say without themselves being propositions.
The switch exists, as a switch, only at the moment of switching, otherwise it 
remains indistinguishable from the rest of the circuit. Our sense organs func­
tion similarly, Bateson avers: they only operate relative to, that is, are only 
triggered by, changes in stimuli, i.e., by events. Bateson is not simply par­
roting the ancient platitude that ‘everything changes.’19 Rather, he is sug­
gesting the more fundamental notion that change is constitutive of perception 
itself. Without change, there is no perception. Hence, to even speak of per­
ception is necessarily to speak of events—and this is to speak in terms of 
dependent arising. A cognitive event is a function of the interaction between 
sense organs and their correlative stimuli. Perception for Bateson, as cogni­
tive awareness for the Buddhists, is fundamentally processual.
But it is also discriminative. Recall the definition of cognitive awareness 
(vijhanaj as “the discrete discernment [of sense-objects].” Just as the 
impingement of a sense organ that gives rise to a moment of cognitive 
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awareness is a temporally distinct event, so too does it depend upon a con­
textually distinct difference. Bateson illustrates this as follows:
I commonly make a heavy dot with chalk on the surface of the 
blackboard ... to achieve some thickness ... If I move my finger 
across the spot, the difference in levels is very conspicuous . . . 
What happens is ... an event, a step function, a sharp change in the 
state of the relationship between my fingertip and the surface of 
the blackboard. This example, which is typical of all sensory expe­
rience, shows how our sensory system . . . can only operate with 
events, which we can call changes ... In the case of vision, it is 
true that we think we can see the unchanging ... the truth of the 
matter is that . . . the eyeball has a continual tremor, called 
micronystagmus. The eyeball vibrates through a few seconds of 
arc and thereby causes the optical image on the retina to move rel­
ative to the rods and cones which are the sensitive end organs. The 
end organs are thus in continual receipt of events that correspond 
to outlines in the visible world. We draw distinctions; that is, we 
pull them out. Those distinctions that remain undrawn are «ot.20
20 Bateson 1979, p. 107.
21 The entire passage from which these are drawn: “To produce news of difference, i.e., 
information, there must be two entities . . . There is a profound and unanswerable question 
about the nature of those ‘at least two’ things that between them generate the difference which 
becomes information by making a difference. Clearly each alone is—for the mind and per­
ception—a non-entity, a non-being. Not different from being, and not different from non- 
being. An unknowable, a Ding an sich, a sound of one hand clapping” (Bateson 1979, p. 77).
Just as the switch does not exist, for the circuit, except while the switch is 
switching, so too distinct stimuli do not exist, for a cognitive system, except 
insofar as they involve contextual differences. This is not to say that ‘differ­
ences are perceived’ (which would abandon the syntax of dependent arising), 
but rather that an awareness of differences is constitutive of perception in the 
same way change is. To even speak of perception is necessarily to speak of 
awareness of differences.
Awareness of differences, however, cannot arise outside of a context, 
since differences only occur between phenomena. “To produce news of dif­
ference, i.e., information,” Bateson observes, “there must be two entities,” 
since “each alone is—for the mind and perception—a non-entity, a non- 
being.”21 An absolutely isolated object would be imperceptible, like an ani­
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mal which stays perfectly camouflaged as long as it does not move. That is, 
just as switches only arise momentarily, differences only arise contextually. 
Contextual differences, however, have no singular location. Bateson thus 
continues:
Difference, being of the nature of relationship, is not located in 
time or in space. We say that the white spot is ‘there,’ ‘in the mid­
dle of the blackboard,’ but the difference between the spot and the 
blackboard is not ‘there.’ It is not in the spot; it is not in the black­
board; it is not in the space between the board and the chalk. . . . 
When I wipe the blackboard, where does the difference go? . . . 
Difference is precisely not substance . . . difference . . . has no 
dimensions. It is qualitative, not quantitative?-2
22 Ibid., p. 109f.
23 Bodhi 1993, p. 4.
24 The Abhidharma-kosa defines as momentary that which perishes immediately after com­
ing into being. (AKBh IV ad 2b-3b; Shastri, p. 568; Poussin, tome 3, p. 4). There was of 
course considerable disagreement as to what exactly constitutes a moment, whether it is divis­
ible and so on. See, for example, Kathavatthu XXII.8, the Abhidhammattha-sangaha, 
(Compendium, p. 25; Nyanatiloka 1980, p. 34); AKBh ad II 46a-b (Shastri, p. 259; Poussin, 
tome 1, p. 228).
Since awareness of differences arises contextually rather than independent­
ly, and is episodic rather than enduring, it has no substantive existence. Not 
being a substance, it neither comes nor goes anywhere. The scriptural pas­
sage cited earlier in this section thus answers Bateson’s query, “where does 
the difference go?”: as an object of awareness, “the eye, arising, does not 
come from any place; perishing, it does not remain in any place.” The aris­
ing of cognitive awareness, which arises in the interface between the sense­
fields and sense-faculties, is axiomatically both momentary and discerning. 
All phenomena, the Buddhist sutras state, are evanescent like “a dew drop, a 
bubble, a dream, a lightning flash or a cloud.”
Bateson’s ideas also suggest an interesting approach to the elusive notion 
of dliarma found in the Abhidharma traditions (roughly 200B.C.E.-600C.E.). 
Although Abhidharma has many dimensions, we shall consider it here only 
insofar as it is a “phenomenological psychology” whose “primary concern . . . 
is to understand the nature of experience, and thus the reality on which it 
focuses is conscious reality, the world as given in experience.”22 3 Abhidharma, 
in this respect, represents an attempt to systematically analyze mental 
processes in terms of experiential events—and it is these momentary24 and 
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distinctive events that are called dharmas?-5 While dharmas have often been 
interpreted as elements of existence, as if they referred to substantive con­
stituents of an objective world, we suggest an interpretation in the terms of 
dependent arising of cognitive awareness described above. A dharma refers, 
that is, like the sensation of the spot on the chalkboard, to each momentary 
and distinct aspect of experience insofar as it is perceptively involved in the 
arising of cognitive awareness. Thus it logically follows from our mode of 
analysis that dharmas arise from nowhere and go nowhere. That is, like the 
distinctions triggered by Bateson’s finger on the chalk spot, dharmas have no 
actual substance nor any singular location; they are neither a ‘something’ nor 
a ‘nothing,’ ontologically speaking.25 6 Consistent with our previous analysis: 
without change or distinctions, there are no dharmas.
25 From the root verb "dhr,’  “to hold, bear, carry, maintain, preserve, keep, possess, use, 
place, fix, etc.” (SED, p. 519). Derived meanings of dharma are “that which is established or 
firm, steadfast, law, statute, prescribed conduct, duty, right, justice, virtue, morality, religion, 
etc.” (SED, p. 510). In the Abhidharma context it is traditionally defined as that which ‘holds’ 
(dharana) its own mark (AKBh ad 1.2b; Shastri, p. 12; Poussin, tome 1, p. 4: svalaksana- 
dharanad dharma).
26 This is arguably implicit in the perspective of dependent arising from the beginning: “He 
who with right understanding sees the arising of the world as it really is, cannot attribute non­
existence to the world; he who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it real­
ly is, cannot attribute existence to the world” (S II 17).
27 Piatigorsky 1984, p. 8.
It is this notion of dharmas—as distinct phenomena which lack location 
and substantive existence, that evanescently arise from nowhere and go 
nowhere—that became the basic unit with which Abhidharma analyzes and 
describes the arising of cognitive awareness and other processes of mind. 
That is to say, that insofar as every one of the conditioning factors that insti­
gate a moment of cognitive awareness themselves become events that give 
rise to conscious awareness, they become dharmas. No dharma can therefore 
be distinguished by itself; “there must be two entities,” as Bateson says. 
Otherwise, each dharma would itself be indiscernible. To even speak of dhar­
mas then is necessarily to speak of a context of distinctions. These are, of 
course, the same conclusions we drew above with our analysis of perception, 
except that they may now also be reflexively applied to the systemic differ­
entiation between the terms of analysis themselves. Abhidharma, in other 
words, is a “metapsychology,” which self-consciously “deals with the vari­
ous concepts and categories of consciousness as the primary objects of 
investigation.”27
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Although we will return to this notion of reflexivity below, we must point 
out here one further implication of the logic, the causal syntax, of dependent 
arising. While dharmas may ultimately refer to experiential phenomena, 
what counts as a dharma in any system of description must always be distin­
guished from other dharmas. Dharmas cannot therefore refer to independent, 
self-sufficient entities. Or rather, and more precisely, we cannot speak about 
the ‘true nature’ of a dharma outside of a given system of analysis.28 29This rel­
ativizes the notion that dharmas have any truly independent ‘distinguishing 
characteristic’ (AKBh ad 1.2b; svalaksana).19 and marks our departure from 
most orthodox Abhidharma systems.
28 Since dharmas are themselves dependently arisen events, they are typically expressed in 
terms of patterns of relationships (with the concomitance of X and Y, Z arises). But because 
the multiple conditions for the arising of a phenomenon were themselves dharmas (X and Y), 
the formula of dependent arising was fairly early on implicitly, or perhaps incipiently, a sys­
tem wherein the sense of each item was mutually and disjunctively defined. That is, Buddhists 
fairly quickly came to recognize that they were working with systems of relationships rather 
than individual terms alone.
29 Harland makes a similar point, citing, then commenting on Saussure’s ‘principle of dif­
ferentiation’ (Saussure 1959, p. 117): “‘The concepts are purely differential and defined not 
by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. 
Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not. ’ Such concepts are like 
holes in a net: specified by their boundaries but empty in themselves” (Harland 1987, p. 15).
We thus come to the surprising conclusion that while these distinctions do 
not refer to substances or entities, either ontologically or epistemologically, 
they are nevertheless constitutive of both perception and the entire system of 
knowledge based upon dhaimas. Without such distinctions, there can be no 
such knowledge. Knowledge thus depends not just upon the arising of an 
awareness of difference triggered by an impingement of a sense organ, but 
even more fundamentally upon the classifications implicit in any such dis­
tinction. The arising of cognitive awareness is therefore not just correlative 
to our sense organs or faculties, but also to the very possibilities for such dis­
tinctions that are enstructured in those organs and faculties in the first place. 
We cannot help seeing something as red rather than blue, hearing pitches as 
high or low, feeling distinct textures or disparate temperatures, or smelling 
odors enticing or odious. Since such distinctions are constitutive of cognitive 
awareness, the classifications they depend upon are also indispensable for 
any arising of discerning cognitive awareness (vijnana). As cognitive scien­
tists Lakoff and Johnson point out:
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Categorization is ... a consequence of how we are embodied. . . . 
We categorize as we do because we have the brains and bodies we 
have and because we interact in the world the way we do .. . What 
that means is that the categories we form are part of our experi­
ence. They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our expe­
rience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely 
intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather, 
the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience.30
30 Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 18f; emphasis in original. Varela, et. al. make a similar 
point: “The visual system is never simply presented with pregiven objects. On the contrary, 
the determination of what and where an object is, as well as its surface boundaries, texture, 
and relative orientation (and hence the overall context of color as a perceived attribute), is a 
complex process that the visual system must continually achieve ... In the words of P. Gouras 
and E. Zrenner, ‘It is impossible to separate the object sensed from its color because it is the 
color contrast itself that forms the object’ ” (Varela, et. al. 1991, p. 167; emphasis added).
31 This is neither a variety of solipsism nor of idealism, since discerning cognitive aware­
ness is an emergent process that arises conditioned by both sense organs and sense-objects. 
Johansson (1979, 28f) similarly concludes that in early Buddhism “there is no independently 
existing world. The world is a dynamic process, constantly being produced and deliberately 
constructed by our senses, our thoughts, and our desires . . . This does not mean that we and 
the world are unreal or a mere illusion. The objects are there but our perceptions of them are 
constituent and essential parts of them . . . the cleavage into ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ was 
never made; the subjective process of image-formation was thought to be part of the object 
itself.”
Similarly, the Chilean biologists Varela and Maturana “do not assert that ‘nothing exists;’ 
they assert that ‘no things exist’ independent of the process of cognition. There are no objec­
tively existing structures; there is no pregiven territory of which we can make a map—the map 
making itself brings forth the features of the territory” (Capra 1997, p. 271; emphasis added).
Our cognitions and distinctions, and the implicit schemas that inform them, 
thus constitute our experienced ‘world.’ While the map may not be the terri­
tory, our world is unavoidably a mapped world.31
Thus far, we have analyzed the arising of discerning cognitive awareness, 
of experience without a subject, as a discrete event, first temporally, as a 
process which occurs when some stimulus impinges upon its correlative 
sense organ or faculty, and then epistemologically, insofar as those stimuli 
are contextually distinguished in dependence upon some embedded and 
implicit system of distinctions. Our further inquiry into the conditions for the 
arising of this world of experience will proceed from this, leading into two 
initially diverging, but ultimately converging, directions: first, we will exam­
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ine the co-evolutionary processes whereby sense organs and faculties come 
to be correlative with the stimuli they are receptive to, the so-called ‘struc­
tural coupling with the world;’ and, dependent upon that, how the classifica- 
tory schemas embedded in these faculties become inseparable from language 
use, which is itself inescapably intersubjective. These two directions will be 
reunited in the notion of the ‘cognitive unconscious,’ a dimension of mind 
resulting from the intertwined co-evolutionary processes of our neurologi­
cal, linguistic and social lives. This development implies that transient and 
insubstantial events, such as the discrete awareness of differences “not locat­
ed in space and time,” can, over time, give rise to the phenomenal world we 
collectively inhabit—bodies and all. These processes involve, however, a 
series of vicious circles—in which thoughts without a thinker lead to acts 
without an actor, and a world without a maker, which leads on to further 
thoughts, etc.—from which we can hardly find respite.
IV. Circular Causality Brings Forth a World: Biology’
In mental process, the effects of differences are to be regarded as transforms of the 
difference which preceded them . . . [Differences . . . and their trains of effects in 
promoting other differences become material of information, redundancy, pattern, 
and so on.
—Bateson, Mina and Nature
How then can there be causality without agents? And, more specifically, how 
is it that our sense-faculties come to be receptive to the particular types of 
stimuli that impinge upon them, which together give rise to our world of 
experience? Our capacities for such awareness of distinctions did not arise 
uncaused, nor are they without their own consequences. They developed in 
dependence upon previous kinds of experience and in turn condition the 
kinds of experience, the kinds of cognitive awareness, that may arise in the 
future. The momentary arising of the discernment of differences is thus part 
of a larger feedback cycle in which “the effects of differences are to be 
regarded as transforms of the differences which preceded them.” These two 
notions—circular causality, in the form of recursive feedback processes, and 
epigenesis, wherein the results of previous events serve as the basis for suc­
ceeding ones—comprise another area where Buddhist philosophy has much 
in common with scientific models of causality, particularly those of cogni­
tive science and evolutionary biology. In both perspectives, these models 
turn our attention away from independent acts of isolated entities and toward 
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particular patterns of interaction that give rise both to immediate forms of 
cognitive awareness and, in the long run, to the living forms we all embody. 
That is, circular causality operates at both micro and macro levels.
At the micro level, as we have seen, discerning cognitive awareness aris­
es whenever our sensory organs are impinged upon, as, for example, through 
the incessant tremor of the eyes which continuously gives rise to visual cog­
nitive awareness. The very processes of living ensure that there is virtually 
no time, even during sleep, when our sense organs are not being impinged 
upon in some fashion. Our pulmonary and respiratory systems alone prevent 
that. To speak of living therefore is necessarily to speak of the continuous 
changes in our skin cells, blood vessels, neurons, etc., which continuously 
impinge upon our senses and hence continuously give rise to moments, how­
ever faint, of cognitive awareness. This inseparability between cognitive 
processes and the processes of living led biological philosophers Maturana 
and Varela to effectively equate the two: “living systems are cognitive sys­
tems and living as a process is a process of cognition”32 In other words, the 
processes of change are equally constitutive of life and of the arising of cog­
nitive awareness.
32 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 13.
33 Capra 1997, p. 68; emphasis added. See also Marvin Minsky, Society of Mind (1986): 
Brains “use processes that change themselves—and this means we cannot separate such 
processes from the products they produce. . . 77ze principal activities of brains are malting 
changes in themselvesas cited in Varela, et. al. 1991, p. 139.
34 Capra 1997, p. 267. Apropos our earlier analysis, we would use the passive voice here.
The reverse, of course, is also true. The cognitive processes inseparable 
from living continuously bring about changes in the organism. All cognitive 
processes, by definition, involve some neural response, some organismic 
activity. As Capra puts it in his Web of Life, “the human nervous system . . . 
interacts with the environment by continually modulating its structure.”33 
That is, there is no cognition without a simultaneous change in the structure 
of an organism, in its cells, neurons, etc. Hence, Capra reverses the equation 
of cognition with life to say that “the structural changes in the system con­
stitute acts of cognition.”34
These two notions—that living entails continuous cognition and cognition 
entails continuous modification of living structure—introduce an important 
causal reciprocity between the structure of sense organs and the arising of 
cognitive awareness. That is, stimuli are always impinging upon the sense 
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organs, giving rise to forms of cognitive awareness; and these processes con­
tinuously but subtly modulate the structures of these organs, which in turn 
influence their receptivity to subsequent stimuli. As we know from Hebb’s 
rule in neural pathways, the occurrence of cognitive processes reinforces 
their underlying neural structures, increasing the likelihood of them reoccur­
ring in conjunction with similar processes. This causal reciprocity between 
cognition and structure provides, then, a working definition of a living sys­
tem: An organism is something that maintains its organization by continu­
ously reinforcing its own structures through its cognitive, that is, living, 
processes.35 Maturana and Varela have thus coined the term ‘autopoiesis,’36 
roughly ‘self-making,’37 to express how organisms “transform matter into 
themselves in a manner such that the product of their operation is their own 
organization.”38 Cognitive systems, living systems, and autopoietic systems 
are here virtually synonymous.
35 See Capra 1997, p. 218: “One type of structural changes are changes of self-renewal. 
Every living organism continually renews itself, cells breaking down and building up struc­
tures, tissues and organs replacing their cells in continual cycles.”
36 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 79f. In the words of Capra: “Autopoiesis, or ‘self-making’ 
is a network pattern in which the function of each component is to participate in the produc­
tion or transformation of other components in the network. In this way the network continual­
ly makes itself. It is produced by its components and in turn produces those components” 
(Capra 1998, p. 162).
37 Buddhists of course would be cautious in using the term ‘self,’ which in Indian philo­
sophical contexts implies an unchanging essence that can cause itself. This is clearly not what 
‘self means in this context. ‘Auto’ or ‘self’ has much the same non-metaphysical sense as it 
does in ‘autopilot,’ here suggesting how these phenomena renew themselves through feed­
back processes comprised of their own structured activities.
38 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 82.
39 Theories of reciprocal or circular causality are commonly used in investigating emergent 
properties, how things come to be, particularly in evolutionary biology. It is, instead, linear 
logic that is the problem: “How is the world of logic, which eschews ‘circular argument,’ 
related to a world in which circular trains of causation are the rule rather than the excep­
tion? ... we shall see that logic is precisely unable to deal with recursive circuits without gen­
erating paradox and that quantities are precisely not the stuff of complex communicating
These reciprocal or autopoietic processes take place not only at the micro 
level of cognition, but also at the macro level of evolution. Both evolution­
ary biology and the view of dependent arising articulate models of circular 
causality to describe how things come into being over the long term through 
recursive feedback processes.39 Briefly,40 evolution occurs through differen­
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tial reproductive success, a process whereby creatures who reproduce more 
prolificaliy pass on more of their heritable characteristics. This depicts “a 
circle of positive feedback” in which whatever differences lead to greater 
reproductive success are steadily reinforced over time. Complex structures 
are gradually built up by the successful changes or modifications of each 
generation, both by their proliferation through greater reproduction, as well 
as by becoming the basis for each succeeding generation. As an epigenetic41 
process, therefore, “every evolutionary step is an addition of information to 
an already existing system.”42 In this fashion, the structures of all life, 
including human life, have come into being conditioned by an immensely 
long, complex and unending series of transformations over countless gener­
ations. As biological creatures, this means that the very minds and bodies we 
embody today reflect the gradually accumulated results of reproductively 
successful interactions between our forebears and their natural and social 
environments.43
This focus upon interactive relationships, however, radically alters our 
ideas of what exactly ‘evolves’ in much the same way that our analysis of the 
dependent arising of cognitive awareness alters our ideas of who exactly 
cognizes.
As we have seen, cognitive awareness arises with the concomitance of an 
appropriate stimulus, an ‘object,’ and its respective sense organ or faculty. 
Cognitive awareness is a function of all of these together, neither of them 
separately. They are also correlative: the kind of stimulus that may impinge 
upon a sense organ depends upon the structure of that organ. Humans, for
systems. In other words, logic and quantity turn out to be inappropriate devices for describing 
organisms and their interactions and internal organizations” (Bateson 1979, p. 21).
40 We cannot do justice to the rich and complex thinking on causality in evolutionary theo­
ry. Nor is there sufficient space to explore its possible parallels with Buddhist ideas of depen­
dent arising. We have touched upon these elsewhere (Waldron 2000).
41 We are adapting this term from embryology and extrapolating it to developmental 
processes in general. Epigenesis generally “stresses the fact that every embryological step is 
an act of becoming (Greek genesis) which must be built upon (Greek epi) the immediate sta­
tus quo ante” (Bateson 1979, p. 52). Epigenesis is an important yet usually implicit correlate 
of circular causality. The best biological example (outside of embryology) is the formation of 
habits, whose underlying neurological networks are gradually built up through repetition.
42 Bateson 1979, p. 22.
43 Carrithers 1992, p. 48f: “The notion of an evolutionary ratchet is consonant with the idea 
of co-evolution, which suggests that organisms may produce changes in the environment, 
changes which redound on themselves, creating a circle of positive feedback.” 
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example, cannot see ultraviolet light or hear ultrasonic sounds; bees and bats 
can. Taking an organism’s eye-view, Maturana and Varela therefore argue 
that “perception should not be viewed as a grasping of an external reality, but 
rather as the specification of one.”44 That is, what constitutes the ‘world’ or 
‘environment’ for any given organism depends upon its specific cognitive 
structures, since it is these that specify its ‘cognitive domain.’4- Biologically 
speaking, then, we cannot speak of an independent, objective world that 
organisms have access to, because “the domain of classes of interactions into 
which an organism can enter constitute its entire cognitive reality.”46 To 
even speak of a ‘world’ therefore is necessarily to speak of a cognizing, that 
is, an interacting organism. Without an organism, there is no ‘environment,’ 
without cognitive interaction, no ‘world.’47 In this sense, and consonant with 
the view of dependent arising, “world and perceiver specify each other.”48 
As Capra notes, “cognition, then, is not a representation of an independently 
existing world, but rather a continual bringing forth of a world through the 
process of living.”49
44 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. xv.
45 See Capra 1997, p. 269f: “Living organisms respond to only a small fraction of the stim­
uli impinging on them ... In this way each living system builds up its own distinctive world 
according to its own distinctive structure . . . The range of interactions a living system can 
have with its environment defines its ‘cognitive domain’ . . . one that is always dependent 
upon the organism’s structure.”
46 Maturana and Varela 1980, p.lOf; emphasis added.
47 As geneticist Richard Lewontin points out, “An environment is something that surrounds 
or encircles, but for there to be a surrounding there must be something at the center to be sur­
rounded. The environment of an organism is the penumbra of external conditions that are rel­
evant to it because it has effective interactions with those aspects of the outer world” 
(Lewontin 2000, p. 48). That is, “Just as there can be no organism without an environment, so 
there can be no environment without an organism” (Lewontin 1983, as cited in Varela, et. al. 
1991, p. 198).
48 Varela, et. al. 1991, p. 172.
49 Capra 1997, p. 267.
50 Tooby and Cosmides 1992, p. 84f.
Defining the ‘world’ or ‘environment’ in this way—as that which comes 
into being for any given organism through the arising of its cognitive 
domain—is also used to describe the processes through which beings or 
species evolve or come into being over time. What constitutes an ‘environ­
ment’ for any organism, Tooby and Cosmides argue, are only “those partic­
ular aspects of the world that are rendered developmentally relevant by the 
evolved design of an organism’s developmental adaptations.”50 And it is 
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“this developmentally relevant environment,” they continue, “the environ­
ment as interacted with by the organism—that, in a meaningful sense, can be 
said to be the product of evolution.”51 Thus, as with our analysis of cognitive 
awareness, evolutionary theory also shifts attention from the arising of enti­
ties to patterns of interaction. “What evolves,” Maturana and Varela observe 
“is always a unit of interactions,”52 neither the organism by itself, and cer­
tainly not the environment alone, but the organism-in-environment. In other 
words, it is patterns of interaction that evolve,53 representing “the evolution 
of the cognitive domains.”54 And, similarly, the evolution of its cognitive 
domain is the evolution of the ‘world’—for that specific kind of organism. In 
this way, a distinctive world is gradually built up in accordance with the dis­
tinctive structures of each living system through its entire history of organ­
ism-environment interactions, a process Maturana and Varela call a 
‘structural coupling with the world.’ Just as with the arising of cognitive 
awareness and the functioning of living systems, the evolution of species is 
seen as the coming into being of specific patterns of interaction rather than 
the arising of independent entities. As physicist Norbert Wiener notes, “We 
are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves.”55
51 “Evolution shapes the relationship between the genes and the environment such that they 
both participate in a coordinated way in the construction and calibration of adaptations. Thus, 
evolutionarily patterned structure is coming in from the environment, just as much as it is 
coming out from the genes.” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, p. 86).
52 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 12.
53 Rose 1997, p. 229f: “Evolutionary stable strategies within and between populations, 
whether or not they culminate in symbiogenesis, require that the ‘unit of selection’ now cease 
to be an individual genotype or even phenotype, and becomes instead a relationship between 
genotypes and/or phenotypes.”
54 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 12: “What evolves is always a unit of interactions defined 
by the way in which it maintains its identity. The evolution of the living systems is the evolu­
tion of the niches of the units of interactions defined by their self-referring circular organiza­
tion, hence, the evolution of the cognitive domains.”
55 Wiener 1950, p. 96.
V. Circular Causality Brings Forth a World: Buddhism
The Elder traced a circle (cakka) on the ground and spoke thus to King Milinda: “Is 
there an end to this circle, sire?”
“There is not, revered sir.”
“Even so, sire, are those cycles (cakka) that are spoken of by the Lord: ‘Visual con­
sciousness arises because of eye and material shapes, the meeting of the three is sen-
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sory impingement; conditioned by sensory impingement is feeling; conditioned by 
feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is kamma [karma]', vision [chakkhu, lit.: 
eye] is born again from kamma’ — is there thus an end of this series?” 
“There is not, revered sir.” . . .
“Even so, the earliest point of [samsaric] time cannot be shown either.”
—Milinda’s Questions.
We may now better appreciate some of the implications of the formula of 
dependent arising, whose cyclic nature warranted the appellation ‘samsaraf 
literally ‘the going around.’ This latter is traditionally taken as the course of 
an individual’s nearly infinite series of lifetimes; in modem Buddhist ver­
naculars it simply refers to this life. As with evolutionary theory, this theory 
of circular causality applies equally well to both temporal dimensions,56 and 
the twelve factors57 of the series of dependent arising—often depicted in the 
famed Wheel of Life (bhava-cakra) on walls of Buddhist temples throughout 
Asia—are typically so explained. The cyclic and epigenetic nature of this 
causal model is epitomized in the reciprocal relationships between cognition 
and structure, that is, between cognitive awareness (vijnana) (and its closely 
associated activities58) and the multiple senses of samskara (Pali sankhara), 
the various structures and activities comprising human embodiment which 
also serve as the basis for cognitive awareness. These two concepts, with the 
crucial addition of the cognitive and emotional afflictions (klesa), constitute 
the dynamic core of our conditioned, cyclic existence—of samsara.
56 This overlapping of causal domains is widely found in scientific theories of causation, 
particularly with circular causality, and complexity and self-organization theory. Bateson 
1979, p. 164: “I shall assume that evolutionary change and somatic change (including learn­
ing and thought) are fundamentally similar.”
57 It should be pointed out that there are so many variations of this formula in the early texts 
that it is not at all obvious what the original formula may have been, if indeed there was just a 
single one, or what exact form it may have taken. There are variations in which certain terms 
are missing and others are added, or in which the chain begins or ends with different factors. 
We may thus consider these formulations less as exclusively defined cause and effect rela­
tionships than as varied expressions of the basic theme of dependent arising, i.e., certain con­
ditions arise in dependence on appropriate combinations of other causes and conditions.
58 Vijnana is one of a set of processes which arise together in response to similar stimuli. 
Feeling and apperception, for example, themselves considered karmic complexes of mind 
(citta) (M I 301: saiind ca vedana cittasankha.ro), are so associated with vijnana as to be vir-
There is no adequate translation for the term samskara. It has both an 
active and a nominal sense, ‘the act of forming’ as well as ‘that which is 
formed.’ In its broadest sense, most phenomena in the world are considered 
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samskaras insofar as they are compounded or put together.59 Thus, samskara 
also comprises the various structures supporting living processes insofar as 
these are constructed from past actions. In other contexts, the term refers to 
the constructive activities in the present, being virtually synonymous with 
intention (cetana), the defining characteristic of karma, actions that accrue 
consequences.60 Samskaras are, like organisms which continually modulate 
their own structures, both continuously and simultaneously conditionz'ng and 
being conditioned by ongoing experience. This is crucial for understanding 
the dynamics of cyclic causality depicted in the series of dependent arising.
Near the beginning of the formula (2) samskara refers to the various phys­
ical, mental and emotional structures or complexes continuing from past 
lives, which condition the arising of cognitive awareness at the time of 
rebirth. In a sense that virtually equates them, Buddhists considered (3) 
vijncina a sine qua non of life, whose advent and departure mark the begin­
ning and end of a particular lifetime.61 Thus the next step in the series, the
tually inseparable: “Feeling, apperception, and cognitive awareness, these factors are con­
joined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in 
order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels, that one apperceives; and 
what one apperceives, that one cognizes” (M I 295; Nanamoli 1995, p. 389); terminology 
altered for consistency.
59 Compounded of the prefix ‘sam,’ ‘with’ or ‘together with,’ and a form of the verbal root 
‘kr,’ ‘to do or make,’ samskara literally means ‘put or made together’ or simply ‘formation.’ 
In its widest sense, samskara refers to the entire phenomenal world, inasmuch as everything 
has been formed from various causes and conditions. In the psychological sense, samskara 
refers to the volitions, dispositions and actions that constitute human life, both insofar as these 
are constructed complexes formed from past actions and constructive activities formative of 
present and future experience. Edgerton (BHSD, 542) describes samskara as “predisposi­
tions, the effect of past deeds and experience as conditioning a new state,” and thus as “con­
ditionings, conditioned states.” Collins also stresses this dual sense: “Both the activity which 
constructs temporal reality, and the temporal reality thus constructed, are samskara” (Collins 
1982, p. 202).
60 S III 60 defines sankhdra (the Pali equivalent of samskara) simply as a “group of inten­
tions,” (cetandkdya), i.e., intentions in regard to form, sounds, etc., the five objects of the 
senses and mind, as does A III 60: “And what, O monks, are sahkhara'l O monks, the 
sankhdra are the sixfold group of the intentions (sahcetana) in regard to material form (etc.).” 
When samskara refers to intentional actions, these are actions that lead to karmic results: 
“Monks, I say kamma is intention', having intended, one does kamma (action) through body, 
speech, and mind” (A III 415).
61 As a factor of samsaric continuity, it is the ‘stationing’ or ‘persistence’ (patitthite) of 
vinndna in this world that constitutes the endless wheel of life and death: “Consciousness 
(yifmdna) being established and growing, there comes to be renewed existence in the future” 
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arising of (4) the psycho-physical organism (name-and-form, nama-rupa), 
depends upon these cognitive processes in order to develop. On the other 
hand, cognitive awareness also depends upon some kind of psycho-physical 
basis (in this world62), so there is an explicitly reciprocal relationship bet­
ween the arising of cognitive awareness and its psycho-physical basis.63 
With the gradual growth of the organism, the conditions for complex cogni­
tive processes develop, epitomized in the next set of factors—(5) the six 
sense-spheres, (6) contact (or sensation), and (7) feeling—which are them­
selves instigated by, or even effectively equated with, the cognitive process­
es as a whole.64 The series has thus far depicted how the various cognitive 
structures—the sense organs and their specific sense-faculties—enable and 
condition the arising of cognitive awareness and has indicated the first, 
affective responses to it.
But to be circular, cognitive awareness must also give rise to new actions 
which reinforce these structures. The sensations and feelings elicited by cog­
nitive awareness thus give rise to the next chain of processes—(8) craving,
(S III 143). ‘“I have said that consciousness conditions name-and-form . . . Were, Ananda, 
consciousness not to descend into the mother’s womb, would name-and-form coagulate 
there?’ ‘No, Lord.’ ‘Were consciousness, having descended into the mother's womb, to 
depart, would name-and-form come to birth in this life?’ ‘No, Lord’ ” (D II 62; PTS). “When, 
then, the three factors of life, heat, and consciousness abandon this body, it lies cast away and 
forsaken like an inanimate stick of wood” (S III 143; PTS).
62 Indian Buddhist cosmology includes non-corporal realms of existence where cognitive 
awareness has non-corporal bases for its arising.
63 S II 114: “Just as two sheaves of reeds might stand leaning one against the other, so too, 
with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be]; with consciousness as condi­
tion, name-and-form [comes to be]. With name-and-form as condition, the six-sense-bases 
[come to be]; with the six-sense-bases as condition, contact... Such is the origin of this whole 
mass of suffering.”
64 “Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is 
contact; with contact as condition there is feeling; with feeling as condition there is craving” 
(M III 282; Nanamoli 1995, p. 1131; also MI 111). Nor, in fact, is this relationship always 
expressed in this sequence: “Consciousness is dependent upon feeling bom of visual contact” 
(M III 260; Johansson 1979, p. 92). The Abhidharma-kosa also mentions cognitive awareness 
(vijnana) in connection with these factors in the series. Based upon a previous moment of 
vijnana, nama-rupa develops with its six organs and the six sense-spheres (dyafcwa). Being 
impinged by an object (vAoya), another moment of cognitive awareness arises, and, through 
the coming together of the three—cognitive awareness, the six sense-spheres (ayatana) and a 
sense-object (visaya)—there is contact, which conduces toward a pleasant feeling, and so on 
(AKBh III 28a-b; Shastri, p. 461).
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(9) grasping and (10) becoming—which eventually reinforce their own 
enabling structures. That is, it is the karmic actions (here ‘becoming’) insti­
gated by the afflictive (klesa) attitudes of craving (tanha) and grasping that 
perpetuate and reinforce the very structures65 that bring about ‘the arising of 
the world’ (S II 73).66 67S II 101 similarly states that when there is pleasure in, 
or passion or craving (tanha) for the sustenances (ahara) of sentient beings 
who are already bom or who desire to come to be (sambhavesina), then,
65 “Karma, craving and ignorance are the cause of samskaras in the future” (AKBh ad VI 
3; Shastri, p.887; Poussin, tome 4, p.137). Pruden identifies this passage as Samyukta, T 
2.88b9.
66 “Dependent on the eye-faculty and visual form, visual cognitive awareness arises; the 
concomitance of the three is sense-impression. Depending on sense-impression is feeling, 
depending on feeling is craving, depending on craving is grasping, depending on grasping is 
becoming, depending on becoming is birth, depending on birth, old age, death, grief, lamen­
tation, suffering, distress and despair come about. This is the arising of the world” (S II 73).
67 We should point out that most of the remaining factors of the twelve-member series are 
simply replaced here by sahkhara. We are indebted to Aramaki (1985, p. 94) for pointing out 
the significance of this passage.
68 Vasubandhu describes this classic account of cyclic causality in terms of one’s ‘mind-stream’: 
“the mind stream (santana) increases gradually by the mental afflictions (klesa) and by actions
consciousness becomes established and comes to growth. Wher­
ever consciousness becomes established and comes to growth, 
there is a descent of name-and-form. Where there is a descent of 
name-and-form, there is growth in the karmic formations 
(sankhdra)^1 Where there is growth in the karmic formations, 
there is the production of future renewed existence.
In short, the series of dependent arising depicts a recursively cyclic process 
between the constructed complexes (samskdra), cognitive awareness 
(vijnana), and the constructing afflicted actions these both enable and elicit: 
for as long as the cognitive processes give rise to sensation and feeling, then 
craving and grasping will tend to arise, which in turn tend to elicit the inten­
tional afflicted activities, the karmic actions, that ultimately create and sus­
tain the structures (samskdra) that constitute further existence and the 
‘arising of the world.’ And for as long as these structures persist, they pro­
vide the conditions that both enable and conduce to further cognitive and 
afflictive processes, and so on. This model of circular causality—enabling 
structures that give rise to cognitive awareness, which in turn elicit the afflic­
tions that instigate actions which reinforce those very structures, etc.—is, I 
submit, the core of the pre-Mahayana Buddhist world-view.68
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These processes are not merely cyclic, of course. They are also ‘epigenetic’ 
in that specific bodily structures and dispositions have been continuously 
‘built up’69 from past experiences and activities, ‘countless lifetimes’ as the 
Buddhists put it. These epigenetic processes, propelled by the feedback loops 
of circular causality, do not concern the evolution of independent entities con­
sidered separately from some external world, but rather reflect the continued 
replication of patterns of interaction, such as expressed in the various formu­
lations of dependent arising. It is these patterns whereby cognitive or living 
systems come into being, their patterns of dependent arising, that constitute the 
‘product’ of evolution. In this sense, both evolutionary biology and Buddhist 
thought analyze the causal relations underlying momentary cognitive process­
es and long-term evolutionary processes in similar ways: the ‘arising of the 
world’ for an individual, its ontogeny, as well as for a species, its phylogeny,70 
can be equally well understood as the ‘arising of the world, the ‘bringing 
forth’ of specific cognitive domains, out of the dynamic vortex of cyclic 
causality.
This reciprocal causality between our cognitive activities (yijnana') and 
the structures of our bodies and minds (samskara) radically revises our 
understanding of the role mental processes play in evolution, the second tra­
jectory of our discussion indicated above. We have just suggested that the 
interaction between cognitive awareness and its supporting structures, which 
entails continuous modification of these structures, is also causally effective 
at a developmental or evolutionary scale. That is, our evolved structures
(karma), and goes again to the next world. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning 
(anadibhavacakraka)” (AKBh III 19a-d; Poussin, tome 2, pp. 57-59; Shastri, pp. 433-34).
69 “This body does not belong to you, nor to anyone else. It should be regarded as [the results of] 
former action that has been constructed and intended and now to be experienced” (S II 64). Most of 
the important processes within the series of dependent arising, such as vijhana and samskara, are 
often said to ‘grow and increase.’ See S II 65, and S II101 above.
70 Varela, et. al. (1991, p. 121) interpret these two dimensions of dependent arising as roughly 
corresponding to phylogeny and ontogeny: “we could say that such traces (karma) are one’s expe­
riential ontogeny . . . Here ontogeny is understood not as a series of transitions from one state to 
another but as a process of becoming that is conditioned by past structures, while maintaining struc­
tural integrity from moment to moment. On an even larger scale, karma also expresses phylogeny, 
for it conditions experience through the accumulated and collective history of our species.” One of 
the main differences with evolutionary theory, however, is that Indian Buddhists see the ‘evolution’ 
of mind in terms of the continuity of individual mind-streams from one lifetime to the next, with 
karma as the basic causal mechanism whereby transformations are transmitted from one life to the 
next. In Darwinian thinking, this function is played by the interaction between genes, the environ­
ment and natural selection. In this sense, Buddhist ideas are more akin to a form of Lamarkianism. 
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reflect the accumulative history of our varied forms of cognitive activity as 
much as vice versa (i.e., not only do samskaras condition vijnana, but 
vijnana conditions samskaras.') We might dwell on this a moment.
As we recall, each form of cognitive awareness arises conditioned by sen­
sory (or mental) stimuli within its cognitive domain, as well as by the psy­
cho-physiological structures (samskdrd), the sense organs or faculties, which 
have been built up by previous karmic activities. These faculties are them­
selves only receptive to particular kinds of stimuli, whose categorical dis­
tinctions are constitutive of that form of cognitive awareness in the first 
place. As Lakoff and Johnson note, “The categories we form are part of our 
experience,”71 not something added on. And since, in the epigenetic causal 
processes outlined above, the activities following the arising of cognitive 
awareness reinforce the very structures (samskdrd) that support them, this 
means that the particular implicit and often innate classificatory systems that 
condition cognitive awareness themselves become important factors in the 
further development of living structures (samskdrd). Living forms have, in 
effect, ‘enstructured’ their cognitive maps, their capacities for cognitive dis­
cernment, through the extended epigenetic processes of circular causality. 
This is true at the individual level, in our neural pathways, for example, as 
well as at the level of the species, as in evolutionary development. As anthro­
pologist, Barash observes,
71 Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 18.
72 Barash 1979, p. 203; emphasis in original.
73 See Deacon 1997, p. 352: “Some sort of positive feedback process like this has been 
invoked by most theories of human cognitive evolution.”
If evolution by natural selection is the source of our mind’s a pri­
ori structures, then in a sense these structures also derive from 
experience—not the immediate, short-term experience of any sin­
gle developing organism, but rather the long-term experience of an 
evolving population. . . . Evolution, then, is the result of innumer­
able experiences, accumulated through an almost unimaginable 
length of time. The a priori human mind, seemingly prepro­
grammed and at least somewhat independent of personal experi­
ence, is actually nothing more than the embodiment of experience 
itself.72
To the extent that this is so (and evolutionary processes are most commonly 
seen in just these terms73), this means that the systemic categorizations and 
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classifications underlying our cognitive systems have had important causal 
influences on human evolution in their own right. But classifications, we 
remember, refer to patterns of relationships, not properties of substances, to 
maps, not territory. That is to say, the distinctions that constitute our cogni­
tive processes—which have no spatial location and come from nowhere and 
go nowhere—were indispensable conditions for the long-term dependent 
arising of our minds and bodies. In Buddhist terms, the dharmas that are dis­
cerned are constitutive conditions for ‘the arising of the world,’ not just epis­
temologically, which is obvious, but ontologically as well. Without 
discernment, there is no cognitive awareness (vz/ndzza); without cognitive 
awareness, and its associated activities, no conditioned structures (samskaray 
and without conditioned structures, no bodies and minds. In short, there 
would be no distinctively human embodiment without the classifications and 
categorizations constitutive of the arising of distinctively human forms of 
cognitive awareness itself.
And what is the most influential source of human categorization and clas­
sification, whose distinctions have no spatial location either inside or outside 
of our brains,74 which represents patterns of mtersubjective interaction that 
have “evolved spontaneously,”75 and is, furthermore, one of the most salient 
features of the physical and mental structures of human life? Language. “The 
major structural and functional innovations that make human brains capable 
of unprecedented mental feats evolved in response to the use of something as 
abstract and virtual as the power of words . . . ,” biological anthropologist 
Deacon intones.76 “The physical changes that make us human are the incar­
nations, so to speak, of the process of using words.” We are not only the 
results of what we have thought, felt and done, but, above all, of what we 
have heard and said. We are, in short, the word become flesh.
74 Deacon 1997, p. 409f. (quoted in note 84 below).
75 Ibid., p. 110.
76 Ibid., p. 322.
VI. Cognitive Awareness Arising from Consensual Communication
The manner and sensory means by which living things construe their environment 
will be the same media through which the environment— ‘the world’—gives itself 
back to them ... Language is a primary medium through which humans inhabit their 
world. Language names what the world is, and the world complies, delivering itself 
back to us through our own namings. Languages are indeed like habitats.
—William Paden, Interpreting the Sacred 
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We may now more directly approach the quandaries raised at the outset of 
this essay: how, absent any external agent or internal experiencer, could our 
cognitive structures, built up through multi-generational, evolutionary streams 
of organism-environment interaction, ever give rise to the phenomenal world 
we inhabit? How, in other words, does ‘our world’—which includes lan­
guage and thought, society and self—emerge out of these systemic interac­
tions and their long-term accumulative results?
Although we began by analyzing cognitive awareness in terms of the con­
comitance of sense-faculties and sense-objects, it should be clear that the 
developmental history of an organism determines more about its present 
cognitive processes than do the stimuli it responds to.77 It is, after all, its par­
ticular cognitive capacities that specify its specific ‘cognitive domain.’ 
Complex organisms have, moreover, developed a reflexivity in which forms 
of cognitive awareness arise in response to stimuli that are internal to the 
organism itself, bringing forth an ‘inner environment’ that is as much a part 
of its total cognitive reality as any apparent external one.78 In the complex 
nervous systems in human beings, in particular, this reflexivity eventually 
gave rise to a distinctive cognitive domain comprised of systems of intersub- 
jective communication utilizing symbolic modes of expression, i.e., lan­
guage.79
77 Oyama 2000, p. 38: “The impact of sensory stimuli is a joint function of the stimuli and 
the sensing organism; the ‘effective stimulus’ is defined by the organism that is affected by 
it.”
78 “There are organisms that include as a subset of their possible interactions, interactions 
with their own internal states (as states resulting from external and internal interactions) as if 
these were independent entities, generating the apparent paradox of including their cognitive 
domain within their cognitive domain. In us this paradox is resolved by what we call ‘abstract 
thinking,’ another expansion of the cognitive domain” (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 13). As 
Maturana points out (p. xxii), the notions of ‘inner’/‘internal’ and ‘outer’/‘external’ are not, 
strictly speaking, part of the direct phenomenological experience of an organism itself, but 
reflect a “metadomain of description” from a larger perspective that is itself based on the very 
reflexivity under discussion here.
79 “At a certain level of complexity,” Capra observes, “a living organism . . . brings forth 
not only an external but also an inner world . . . linked intimately to language, thought, and 
consciousness” (Capra 1997, p. 270).
In his sweeping book, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Lan­
guage and the Brain, Terrence Deacon argues that what distinguishes human 
beings is not so much the size of our brains as its special mode of organiza­
tion: human brains support systems of symbolic reference. Symbolic refer­
ence differs from other modes of reference:
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Because symbols do not directly refer to things in the world, but 
indirectly refer to them by virtue of referring to other symbols, 
they are implicitly combinatorial entities whose referential powers 
are derived by virtue of occupying determinate positions in an or­
ganized system of other symbols.80
80 Deacon 1997, p. 100.
81 Cf. Wittgenstein 1975, p. 317: “If, for instance, I say such and such a point in the visual 
field is blue, I not only know that, I also know that the point isn’t green, isn’t red, isn’t yellow 
etc. I have simultaneously applied the whole colour scale ... It’s such a system which is com­
pared with reality, not a single proposition” (Philosophical Remarks, Appendix 2, cited in 
Stem 1995, p. 99f).
82 Deacon elaborates: “[Sjymbols cannot be understood as an unstructured collection of 
tokens that map to a collection of referents because symbols don’t just represent things in the 
world, they also represent each other. . . . Because of this systematic relational basis of sym­
bolic reference, no collection of signs can function symbolically unless the entire collection 
conforms to certain overall principles of organization. . . . [and] are organized so as to form a 
logically closed group of mappings from symbol to symbol. . . . Thus syntactic structure is an 
integral feature of symbolic reference, not something added and separate” (Deacon 1997, p. 
99f). It is grammar that provides this organization.
83 As Capra points out, “as it keeps interacting with its environment, a living organism will 
undergo a sequence of structural changes ... an organism’s structure at any point in its devel­
opment is a record of its previous structural changes and .. . each structural change influences 
the organism’s future behavior” (Capra 1997, p. 220).
84 “It is simply not possible,” Deacon concludes, “to understand human anatomy, human 
neurobiology, or human psychology without recognizing that they have all been shaped by 
something that could best be described as an idea: the idea of symbolic reference” (Deacon 
1997, p. 409f).
In other words, symbolic systems are self-referential in the same way as the 
classificatory systems we analyzed above are: their individual items are dis­
tinguished by the disjunctive differences between them,81 and interpreted in 
accordance with systemic patterns of relationship, i.e., grammar.82 
Language, it is clear, is the mode of symbolic reference par excellence.
Our symbolic or linguistic capabilities did not, of course, spring fully 
formed out of the head of Zeus. They too are part of the accumulative, con­
structive and interactive processes of evolution whereby cognitive processes 
condition living structures, which in turn condition further cognitive proc­
esses and so on.83 As symbolic communication ‘dependently arose’ in early 
hominid species it became a powerful evolutionary force in its own right, 
radically and irrevocably changing the structures and processes of the human 
brain.84 This momentous change centered on our increasingly enlarged pre­
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frontal cortex, where such symbolizing processes are apparently concentrat­
ed.85 As language use and this ‘prefrontalization’ mutually reinforced each 
other, the symbolic-linguistic mode of cognition which is dependent upon 
them came to dominate other, originally non-linguistic, processes. “Brain­
language co-evolution has significantly restructured cognition from the top- 
down . . . ,” Deacon argues, such that
85 “[SJymbol use itself must have been the prime mover for the prefrontalization of the 
brain in hominid evolution” (Deacon 1997, p. 336)
86 Deacon 1997, p. 417; emphasis added. See also p. 265: “Prefrontal computations out- 
compete other cognitive computations and tend to dominate learning in us as in no other 
species. In simple terms, we have become predisposed to use this one cognitive tool whenev­
er an opportunity presents itself, because an inordinate amount of control of the other process­
es in the brain has become vested in our prefrontal cortex. The way the parietal cortex handles 
tactile and movement information, the way the auditory cortex handles sound information, the 
way the visual cortex handles visual information, are all now much more constrained by pre­
frontal activity than in other species.”
87 Geertz 1973, p. 49: “As our central nervous system—and most particularly its crowning curse 
and glory, the neocortex—grew up in great part in interaction with culture, it is incapable of direct­
ing our behaviour or organizing our experience without the guidance provided by systems of sig­
nificant symbols. ... To supply the additional information necessary to be able to act, we were 
forced, in turn, to rely more and more heavily on cultural sources—the accumulated fund of sig­
nificant symbols. Such symbols are thus not mere expressions, instrumentalities, or correlates of 
our biological, psychological, and social existence; they are prerequisites of it. Without men, no 
culture, certainly; but equally, and more significantly, without culture, no men.”
its secondary effects have also ramified to influence the whole of 
human cognition. Human beings approach the world of sensory 
stimuli and motor demands differently from other species . . . even 
when our symbolic-linguistic abilities are uninvolved.86
Human cognitive processes, even simple sensory ones, in other words, un­
avoidably arise in dependence upon our ‘linguistified’ brain. Language, 
then, along with the systemic distinctions upon which it depends, is not 
something added onto human cognitive processes. Systemic symbolic think­
ing is constitutive of nearly all normal human cognitive processes.87
This prefrontalization of human cognition, however, is fraught with unin­
tended consequences, consequences that follow from the very nature of 
linguistic symbolification. As classificatory systems based upon mutually 
dependent yet disjunctively defined terms, languages are largely convention­
al; they have no natural correspondence with their referents and hence never 
really ‘get at’ reality. Just as searching for the definition of a word in a dic­
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tionary leads only to other words, the meaning of a term in any symbolic sys­
tem depends more upon other terms than on the ‘things’ themselves. The 
things themselves stand outside the system of symbolic reference, not in the 
superficial sense that symbols or words stand for something else, but in the 
deeper sense that what they stand for is primarily determined by how they 
function within the system as a whole.
Language is therefore not only a result of the long-term, interdependent 
feedback cycles of evolution. The self-referentiality of symbolic reference 
also inevitably gives rise to its own feedback cycles. “[Symbolically mediat­
ed models of things. . . Deacon notes, “exhibit complicated nonlinearity 
and recursive structure as well as nearly infinite flexibility and capacity for 
novelty due to their combinatorial nature.”88 Therefore, to the extent that 
organisms ‘specify their cognitive domains’ through their specific cognitive 
capacities, the cognitive domains of human beings are inescapably informed 
by the recursive and self-referential cycles of linguistic symbolification.89 
“We cannot help but see the world in symbolic categorical terms,” Deacon 
declares, “dividing it up according to opposed features, and organizing our 
lives according to themes and narratives.”90 This linguistification of human 
cognitive processes thus represents a physiologically enstructured, dominat­
ing cognitive strategy characterized by compulsive yet creative recursivity, 
based upon words that are defined interdependently and systemically, rather 
than independently or substantively, and whose ultimate meanings are con­
ventionally determined. No wonder Deacon ambivalently observes: “we are 
not just a species that uses symbols. The symbolic universe has ensnared us 
in an inescapable web.”91
88 Deacon 1997, p. 434.
89 Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 50: “Through language we interact in a domain of descriptions 
within which we necessarily remain even when we make assertions about the universe or about our 
knowledge of it. This domain is both bounded and infinite; bounded because everything we say is 
a description, and infinite because every description constitutes in us the basis for new orienting 
interactions, and hence, for new descriptions. From this process of recursive application of descrip­
tions self-consciousness emerges as a new phenomenon in a domain of self-description, with no 
other neurophysiological substratum than the neurophysiological substratum of orienting behavior 
itself. The domain of self-consciousness as a domain of recursive self-descriptions is thus also 
bounded and infinite.”
90 Deacon 1997, p. 416.
91 Ibid., p. 436. A web, we might add, without a weaver. See also anthropologist Rappaport 
on language: “It would not, indeed, be an exaggeration to claim that humanity is [its] cre­
ation” (Rappaport 1999, p. 5).
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Buddhist analyses of mind also connect reflexivity, and the linguistic cat­
egorizations associatied with it, with cognitive processes (vijnand) that have 
been built up through the accumulating, epigenetic cycles of dependent aris­
ing. These are closely associated with ‘mental’ cognitive awareness (Skt. 
mano-vijnancr, Pali mano-vinnana), the only cognitive modality not directly 
based upon a sense-faculty but upon the faculty of mind lmc.no or marcus).92 
Its reflexivity and recursivity also depend upon the reciprocal relationships 
between sensory cognitive awareness, non-sensory (symbolic) ‘objects’ 
such as thoughts or ideas, and the ensnaring web of conceptual proliferation 
(Skt. prapanca', Palipapahca) entailed by language use.
92 Derived from the Sanskrit root ‘man,’ “to think, believe, imagine, suppose, conjecture,” 
manas (Pali mano) is related to the Latin ‘mens,’ “mind, reason, intellect,” and ultimately to 
the English “mind, mentation,” and “to mean” (PED, pp. 515, 520; SED, p. 783).
93 “Friend, these five faculties each have a separate field, a separate domain, and do not 
experience each other’s field and domain, that is, the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose fac­
ulty, the tongue faculty, and the body faculty. Now these five faculties, each having a separate 
field, a separate domain, not experiencing each other’s field and domain, have mind as their 
resort, and mind experiences their fields and domains” (M I 295; Nanamoli 1995, p. 391).
94 Although from a later period (5th century C.E.), the Abhidharma-kosa states that “visual- 
cognitive awareness is aware of blue, but not ‘that it is blue;’ mental cognitive awareness is 
aware of blue and aware ‘that it is blue’” (AKBh ad III 30c-d).
95 See Reat 1990, p. 305: “Language was thought of as a discovery of the inherent concep­
tual relationships among things, so that from a very early period in Indian thought, conceptu­
alization was regarded as primarily a verbal phenomenon.”
96 SN 834 speaks of thinking on the views in the manas (manasa dithigatani cintayanto)
Mental cognitive awareness arises in conjunction with two kinds of 
events. First, the occurrence of any of the five forms of sensory cognitive 
awareness instigates a reflexive mental awareness of that initial awareness.93 
An awareness that something is blue, for example, arises (for most Indian 
Buddhist schools) in two discrete steps: first, a simple sensory awareness 
without ‘self-awareness’ arises, followed immediately by a mental cognitive 
awareness that is reflexively aware ‘that such and such a cognitive aware­
ness has occurred.’94
This reflexivity is closely related to speech, considered in early Indian 
thinking as the language of thought and ideas.95 The second class of objects 
that instigates mental cognitive awareness, dharmas, thus includes reflection 
or thinking (both considered samskdrci of speech, vitakka-vicara vacisahkhara, 
M I 301), which arise in conjunction with mind (manas), the faculty that sup­
ports mental cognition.96 The reflexivity that mental cognitive awareness 
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provides is therefore typically bound up with its linguistic capacities. But, 
like language itself, this tends to initiate endless rounds of recursivity, that is, 
papanca (prapanca), mental or conceptual proliferation:97
Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The 
meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is 
feeling. What one feels, that one apperceives. What one apper- 
ceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one men­
tally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the 
source, apperceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation 
\papanca-sannd-sankha\ beset a man with respect to past, future, 
and present forms cognizable through the eye. . . . mind-objects 
cognizable through the mind.98
In other words, what one cognizes, one apperceives; what one apperceives, 
results in conventional linguistic usage (vohara),99 which becomes a 
condition for further cogitation, conceptualization and mental proliferation, 
which in turn serve ‘as the source’ for more cognition and apperceptions 
regarding the objects of cognitive awareness, and so on.
Language, concepts and classification are thus not only inseparable from 
most processes of cognition, but they also give rise to a runaway recursivity 
in their own right, perpetuating our ‘inescapable web.’ Indeed, conceptual 
proliferation is so utterly entangled in its own reciprocal relationships—with 
(1) contact100 (which sometimes conditions the arising of cognitive aware­
ness), (2) apperception101 (which always accompanies it), and (3) thought
and S 1207 of the “reflective thoughts of mano” (manovitakka). See Johansson 1965, pp. 183, 
186.
97 See Nanananda 1971 for a book-length treatment of this important concept in the early 
Pali sources.
98 M I 11 If (Nanamoli 1995, p. 203). Translation altered for terminological consistency.
99 As the Buddha said (A III 413): “Apperceptions (saiind), I say, result in conventional 
usage (vohara). As one comes to know a thing, so one expresses (yoharati) oneself, ‘Thus I 
have apperceived. ’ ” Rhys-Davids’ Pali-English Dictionary defines vohara as “current appel­
lation, common use (of language), popular logic, common way of defining, usage, designa­
tion, term.” Vohara is equivalent to Sanskrit ‘vyavahara.’
100 A II 161: “Whatever is the range of the six spheres of contact, that itself is the range of 
prolific conceptualization. And whatever is the range of the prolific conceptualization, that 
itself is the range of the six spheres of contact” (Nanananda 1971, p. 21).
101 SN 874 states that “the series of prolific ideation is caused by apperception.” S IV 71 
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itself102—that it is often a synonym for phenomenal, cyclic existence as a 
whole.103
The most deeply entrenched source of these recursive possibilities, which 
also doubles back to instigate its own linguistically generated recursivity, is 
no doubt our sense of self as an enduring, experiencing agent. As one text 
declares, the notion “ ‘I am’ is a proliferation; ‘I am this’ is a proliferation; ‘I 
shall be’ is a proliferation.”104 Thus, not only is “the label ‘I,’ ” according to 
Bhikkhu Nanananda, an “outcome ofpapanca,”1^ 5 but the very thought ‘I 
am’ is also, according to the Sutta-nipata, the root (mii/a) of proliferation 
itself.106 In other words, as long as the thought ‘I am’ persists, so long will 
endless cycles of apperceptions, conceptual proliferation and further apper­
ceptions, and so forth, keep spinning.
This sense of self, however, derives its compelling cogency, its enduring 
and endearing allure,107 from the same social and linguistic matrix other
says: “All men who have prolific ideation go on proliferating when apperceiving” (Johansson 
1979, p. 192f).
102 Nanananda describes the reciprocity between the series of proliferation-apperception, 
‘ papahca-sahnd-sankhd’ (which he interprets (5) as “concepts, reckonings, designations or 
linguistic conventions characterised by the prolific conceptualizing tendency of the mind”) 
and thought (yitakka) itself: “the word or concept grasped as an object for ratiocination, is 
itself a product of 'papanca'. This, in its turn breeds more of its kind when one proceeds to 
indulge in conceptual proliferation (papanca). Concepts characterised by the proliferating 
tendency (papanca-sanna-sankha) constitute the raw-material for the process and the end 
product is much the same in kind . . . Thus there is a curious reciprocity between ‘vitakka’ 
[thought] and ‘papahca-sahha-sarikha’—a kind of vicious circle, as it were. Given 'papaiica- 
sahhd-sahkha', there comes to be ‘vitakka’ and given ‘vitakka’ there arise more ‘papahca- 
sanhd-sahkhci”’ (Nanananda 1971, p. 25).
103 See Schmithausen 1987, p. 509ffi n. 1405, andp. 522ff, n. 1425.
104 S IV 202f (Bodhi 2000, p. 1259).
105 Nanananda 1971, p. 11.
106 “With what manner of insight, and not grasping anything in this world, does a monk real­
ize Nibbana? Let him completely cut off the root of concepts tinged with the prolific tendency 
(papahca), namely, the thought ‘I am’” (SN 915-16; Nanananda 1971, p. 34f). Translation 
altered slightly, (katham disva nibbati bhikkhu anupadiyano lokasmim kind. Millam 
papahcasahkhayati Bhagava manta asmiti sabbam uparundhe.) Nanananda takes ‘manta' as 
‘thinker’ rather than thought.
107 The Buddha gives the following conception of a self: “That which is this self for me that 
speaks, that experiences and knows, that experiences, now here, now there, the fruition of 
deeds lovely or depraved, it is this self for me that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to 
change, that will stand firm for ever and ever” (M I 8).
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words and symbols do: symbolic representation.108 Like language, this sym­
bolic self is a product of massive interdependency; like other relational phe­
nomena, it has no substantive existence in time or space; and like all 
symbols, it appears simultaneously autonomous and disembodied. More idea 
than thing, this symbolic self is nothing if not virtual. “It is a final irony,” 
Deacon concludes,
108 “Self-representation . . . ,” Deacon suggests, “could not be attained without a means for 
symbolic representation” (Deacon 1997, p.451). See also Nanananda 1971, p. 11: “The label 
T thus superimposed on the complex contingent process, serves as a convenient fiction of 
thought or a short-hand device ... it is the outcome ofpapanca ... The ego notion is an exten­
sion in thought not faithful to facts.”
109 Deacon 1997, p. 452.
that it is the virtual, not actual, reference that symbols provide, 
which gives rise to this experience of self. The most undeniably 
real experience is a virtual reality. ... its virtual nature notwith­
standing, it is the symbolic realm of consciousness that we most 
identify with and from which our sense of agency and self-control 
originate.109
Indian Buddhists could hardly have said it better. The irony, of course, is that 
this symbolic self is at the ‘root’ of proliferating ideation, the matrix of run­
away recursivity in which, by all appearances, we all remain ensnared.
VII. The Cognitive Unconscious as Embodied Structuring of Experience 
The theory of dependent arising and evolutionary biology, we have seen, 
both depict long-term co-evolutionary relationships through which certain 
cognitive processes gradually become ‘enstructured’ into physiological and 
psychological structures (vijnana, etc., condition samskaras), structures 
which largely condition how subsequent forms of cognitive awareness may 
arise (samskaras condition vijnana). And so it is with both language and the 
symbolic self that language enables. They are both complex results of inter­
dependent processes which have, over time, become enstructured into endur­
ing physiological and psychological structures, and which continuously 
influence the arising of cognitive awareness.
Like habits, such enstructuration is thought to occur for reasons of effi­
ciency, which allows these processes to become increasingly automatic. 
Deacon declares:
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It is the goal of most cognitive processes to make information pro­
cessing unconscious and automatic—as quick, easy, and efficient 
as possible—because these sorts of processes take comparatively 
little in the way of neural representation and energy to manage, 
compared to the active adaptational processes we experience as 
consciousness.110
Think, for example, of the enormous complexity involved in a simple con­
versation: hearing, talking, breathing, moving, remembering the last few 
words, anticipating the next, parsing it all while simultaneously assessing 
emotional responses and observing body language, and so on.111 All these 
processes are cognitive in the sense that they entail modulations, however 
slight, of the underlying neural and physiological structures of the organism. 
But they need not, indeed cannot, all result in or require conscious aware­
ness. Most of them involve underlying neurological processes that have 
become ‘unconscious and automatic,’ only some of which lead to conscious 
awareness—both of which, however, must occur simultaneously, constantly 
informing and influencing the other, without which even simple conversa­
tion would be impossible.
We must distinguish, therefore, between those immediate but intermittent 
processes of discerning cognitive awareness accompanied by attention, and 
the underlying but continuous processes operating automatically. These lat­
ter are subliminal, arising outside of immediate conscious awareness. We 
must, therefore, analyze the arising of cognitive awareness into both suMim- 
inal as well as supraliminal dimensions.
This distinction was already intimated in the early Pali texts in two distinct 
formulas for the arising of cognitive awareness:
Depending on eye and forms visual cognitive awareness arises.112
1,0 Deacon 1997, p. 456.
111 In understanding speech alone, we are able to hear a continuous flow of sound, discern 
the discrete phonemes which, together, make up the specific words, a sufficient number of 
which must be held in short-term memory long enough to effectively parse their grammatical 
role within the sentence. The sentence itself subserves the larger rhetorical purposes of that 
speech act, which is itself embedded in a specific social or pragmatic context. All the while, 
we are also attentive to all the non-semantic, non-syntactic, yet nevertheless crucial commu­
nicative cues, such as changes in intonation, rhythm, word choice, hand and facial gestures, 
body language, etc. We are somehow aware of these all the time in any common conversation, 
despite the fact that only one sound occurs at a time (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. lOf).
112 S II 73.
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Depending on sahkhara {samskara) cognitive awareness arises.113
113 S II2.
154 The distinctions between these two forms of cognitive awareness are most succinctly 
stated in the Proof Portion of the Yogacarabhumi: “l.a) The alaya-vijfiana has past 
samskaras as its cause {hetu), while the arising forms of cognitive awareness, visual, etc., 
have present conditions as their cause. As it is taught in detail: ‘the arising of the [forms of] 
cognitive awareness comes about due to the sense-faculties, the sense objects and attention.’” 
This same distinction is also articulated by Maturana and Varela’s theory, as described by 
Capra: “cognition involves two kinds of activities that are inextricably linked: the mainte­
nance and continuation of autopoiesis and the bringing forth of a world” (Capra 1997, p. 268).
115 Bateson 1979, p. 121.
116 The Pravrtti-Portion of the Yogacarabhumi: “ 1 .b) B.2. The [alaya-vijfiana) always has 
an object, it is not sometimes this and sometimes that (fanyathatva). However, from the first 
moment of appropriation [of the body at conception] for as long as life lasts (yavaj jivam) [its] 
perception (viihaptr. T. ‘rigs pa') arises always having one flavor {ekarasatvena) [that is, 
homogeneously], 1 ,b) B.3. It should be understood that the alaya-vijfiana is momentary
It was left, however, to Indian Buddhists of the Yogacara school (ca. 
2nd-7th century C.E.), some fifteen centuries before Freud, to explicitly dis­
tinguish between the forms of supraliminal cognitive awareness {pravrtti- 
vijnana) that arise in conjunction with present stimuli accompanied by 
attention, and subliminal forms of cognitive awareness, subsumed under the 
term ‘dlaya-vijnana' (roughly ‘store-house’ consciousness), that arise in 
conjunction with more enduring psycho-physiological structures 
{samskara))14
This Buddhist ‘cognitive unconscious,’ however, is no more an experi­
encer, agent or enduring subject than was cognitive awareness in the earlier 
model. It still has all the qualities and qualifications mentioned above: “it is 
related to the notion ‘change’ rather than to the notion ‘object’ . . . admit 
[ting] only news of difference,”115 it grows and develops through the accu­
mulating, epigenetic processes of cyclic causality, and its cognitive domain 
constitutes a particular cognitive reality, a dependently arisen ‘world of ex­
perience’. Specifically, it denotes a form of discerning subliminal awareness 
that arises from moment to moment in dependence upon specific kinds of 
stimuli, i.e., the enduring physiological and psychological structures {sam- 
skara) whose ongoing processes underlie all sentient existence. Put the other 
way around, since these samskaras are continuously being modulated in the 
very processes of living, they provide the ever-present stimuli through which 
subliminal forms of awareness arise in each and every moment of life.116 In 
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this sense, and like simple vz/nanas before it, the dlaya-vijndna is virtually 
equated with the continuity of samsaric existence itself.
What are these structures that give rise to subliminal cognitive processes 
(dlaya-vijnana)) And how do they together continuously ‘specify a cogni­
tive domain,’ gradually building up and ‘bringing forth’ our multi-dimen­
sional world of human experience?
According to the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, one of the earliest Yogacara 
texts to elucidate this concept, this form of subliminal cognitive awareness,
the mind with all the seeds matures, congeals, grows, develops, 
and increases117 based upon the two-fold substratum118 (or: appro­
priation, upaddna)', that is, (1) the substratum of the material 
sense-faculties along with their supports (*sadhistana-rupindriya- 
upaddna), (2) and the substratum which consists of the predisposi­
tions toward conceptual proliferation in terms of conventional 
usage of images, names, and conceptualizations.119
This dense passage recalls and rather formidably reformulates what we have 
just seen: that there is an intimate, and accumulating, relationship between
regarding [its] object, and though it arises continuously in a stream of instants, it is not unitary 
{ekatva)” (D.4a3-5; T.580al2-18).
117 Tib.: sa bon thams cad pa ’i sems mam par smin cing ‘jug la rgyas shing ‘phel ba dang 
yangspar ‘gyur ro. Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen: *(sarvabijakam cittam) vipacy- 
ate sammurcchati vrddhim virudhim vipulatam apadyate. This closely parallels passages 
found in Pali texts, S III 53, D III 228: vinnanam . . . viddhim virulhim vepullam apajjeyya. 
(Schmithausen 1987, p. 356, n. 508).
118 Comprised of the prefix ‘upa,’ ‘towards, near, together with,’ plus the noun 'ddanaj 
“receiving, taking to oneself” (SED), upadana, like sankhara, may refer to both an active 
process and a passive product, both a conditioning and a conditioned state. It is not only 
‘grasping, attachment, finding one’s support by, nourished by, taking up,’ but also ‘fuel, sup­
ply,’ ‘the material out of which anything is made,’ or even ‘substratum by means of which an 
active process is kept alive or going’ (Apte, p. 471; PED, p. 149. See also Schmithausen 1987, 
P- 72).
119 Schmithausen reconstructs the last phrase as *nimitta-nama-vikalpa-vyavahara-pra- 
panca-vasand-upadana. The import of this dauntingly long (and proliferating!) string of con­
cepts is well summarized in his definition (Schmithausen 1987, p. 357, n. 511) of the first 
item, nimitta, as “in this context, objective phenomena as they are experienced or imagined, 
admitting of being associated with names, and being (co-) conditioned by subjective concep­
tual activity (yikalpa), which has become habitual so that it permeates all (ordinary) percep­
tions and cognitions” (Emphasis added).
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bodily sensory awareness, conventional linguistic usage (vo/tara),120 and the 
runaway recursivity of prapanca, conceptual proliferation. Here, however, 
all these processes are said to be subtle and “difficult to discern (duspar- 
iccheda) even by the wise ones of the world.”121
120 See A III 413, quoted in note 99 above.
121 l.b) B.l (D.4a3-5; T.580al2—18) of the Pravrtti-Portion of the Yogdcarabhumi. The 
mental factors associated with the alaya-vijnana are similarly subtle: “2.b) A. The alaya- 
vijnana is associated by association (samprayoga) with the five omnipresent factors connect­
ed with mind (cittasamprayukta-sarvatraga): attention (manaskdra), sense-impression 
(sparsa), feeling (vedana), apperception (samjna), and volitional impulse Iceland). .. 2.b) B. 
These dharmas, then, . . . are subtle (suksma) because they are hard to perceive 
(durvijhanatva) even for the wise ones in the world” (D.4a3-5; T.580al2— 18). See also TBh, 
19.14-15, ASBh, 21.9f, Hakamaya 1979, p. 71, n. 6, 7, and Schmithausen 1987, p. 389f. for 
an extensive discussion of aparicchinna.
122 Pravrtti-Portion (D.3b7-4a3; T.580a2-12): “l.b) A.2. The ‘outward perception of the 
external world, whose aspects are undiscemed’ (bahirdha-aparicchinnakara-bhajana- 
vijhapti) means the continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuity of the world based 
upon that very alaya-vijnana which has inner appropriation as an object, l.b) A.3. Thus, one 
should know that the way the alaya-vijnana [arises] in regard to the object of inner appropri­
ation and the object of the external [world] is similar to a burning flame which arises inward­
ly while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil, respectively.”
123 Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 9-15.
This model articulates the underlying structures, the infrastructure as it 
were, through which all forms of cognitive awareness—both subliminal and 
supraliminal—are thought to arise. Elaborating on this, the Yogdcarabhumi 
describes how these predispositions (vasana) toward conceptual prolifera­
tion help bring forth a subliminal awareness of an ‘external’ world. That is, 
subliminal cognitive awareness (alaya-vijnana') continuously arises in con­
junction with (1) the living sense-faculties and (2) the predispositions in­
stilled by past linguistic experience, conceptualization, naming, etc., bringing 
forth as its cognitive domain an ‘external world’ outside of immediate 
awareness.122 We live, that is, in a ‘world’ whose predominant structuring 
influences—linguistic and physiological structures built up over time through 
extended organism-environment interaction—we cannot fully discern. This 
is, if I am not mistaken, nearly exactly the current notion of the ‘cognitive 
unconscious.’123
As was suggested above, there must also be a continuous and simultane­
ously reinforcing relationship between sub- and supra-liminal cognitive 
processes in order for even ordinary human activities such as conversations 
to occur. This relationship, this ‘intrapsychic causality,’ if you will, is also 
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accumulative in the epigenetic sense we have already discussed, i.e., experi­
ence builds upon itself. That is, on the one hand, all supraliminal cognitive 
processes are said to simultaneously arise based on subliminal cognitive 
awareness (alaya-vijnana}  ^which arises on its own physiological and psy­
cho-linguistic bases. In other words, our present experience is already con­
tinuously and simultaneously informed by the classifications implicit in all 
forms of cognitive awareness, which now, however, are seen to occur uncon­
sciously and automatically. On the other hand, the arising of supraliminal 
cognitive awareness also continuously modulates or transforms the forms of 
unconscious cognitive awareness themselves, implanting ‘seeds’ (bija) or 
‘impressions’ (vdsana) as the texts say,124 25 which in turn condition the forms 
of supraliminal cognitive awareness, and so on. In modem terms, the neural 
networks that enable any specific form of conscious perception to occur are 
themselves always modified by repeated instances of those same types of 
perceptions. These reciprocally reinforcing and gradually accumulating 
processes, however, take place not only simultaneously, ceaselessly and 
mostly automatically, but also, in large part, unconsciously.
124 Samdhinirmocana Sutra. Ch. V. 4: “Visalamati, the six groups of cognitive awareness, 
that is, visual cognition, aural-, olfactory-, gustatory-, tactile-, and mental cognitive aware­
ness, arise supported by and depending on (sanisritya pratihaya) the appropriating cognitive 
awareness (addna-vijnana) [a synonym of the alaya-vijnana]." The Pravrtti-Portion of the 
Yogacarabhumi (D. 6a4-6; T. 580c26-58la2): “4.b) B.l. The alaya-vijnana arises and func­
tions simultaneously with the [forms of] arising cognitive awareness, too.”
125 The Pravrtti-Portion of the Yogacarabhumi (D.5a3-7; T. 580b 17—29): “3.c) In this way 
one should understand establishing the arising [of the alaya-vijnana] is by means of the alaya- 
vijnana and the [supraliminal forms of] arising cognitive awareness being reciprocal condi­
tions of each other: by means of [the alaya-vijnana] being the seed [A.I.] and creating the 
support [of the forms of arising cognitive awareness (pravrtti-vijhana)] [A.2.], and by [the
And, as our earlier analyses also suggest, if linguistic categories and clas­
sifications underlie all forms of cognitive awareness, subliminal as well as 
supraliminal, then we are susceptible to the same conceptual prolixity, the 
endless, ensnaring recursivity that language entails, at unconscious levels as 
well. Accordingly, our sense of self—enabled by and arising out of the 
reflexivity of linguistic and symbolic representation—has also become so 
enstructured that it, too, occurs ‘unconsciously and automatically’ in nearly 
every moment of mind. Specifically, this sense of self not only arises in ref­
erence to the ongoing forms of subliminal cognitive awareness (alaya- 
vijnana), but it is also associated with the linguistically expressed processes 
of conceptual thought:
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The mind (manas) whose mode (akara') is conceiving (manyana) 
‘I-making’ (ahamkara), the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimana), always 
arises and functions simultaneously with the alaya-vijnana . . . 
That [mind] has the mode of taking the alaya-vijnana as [its] 
object and conceiving [it] as ‘I am [this]’ (asimtf) and ‘[this is] I’ 
(aham
We may now more fully appreciate the poignancy of our human condition, 
that inescapable web woven by nothing more than a ‘virtual self,’ the conceit 
‘I am.’ As we have seen, the systemic classifications underlying all human 
cognitive processes have informed and instigated intentional activities that, 
in the long term, have been as instrumental in shaping the contours of human 
evolution as our more obvious physiological features. This linguistically- 
based symbolic self, unconsciously embedded and virtually real, has played 
no less a role in the coming to be of our entire ‘world of experience.’ This is 
because it is our behavior, the actions (karma} arising out of the dynamic 
interaction between (1) our physical embodiment, (2) the constructive influ­
ences of language, (3) our embedded sense of selfhood (all these being most­
ly subliminal), and (4) our supraliminal forms of cognitive awareness, that 
are most causally important, most effectively ensnaring. For these are indeli­
bly informed by unconscious forms of self-grasping.
In commenting on the idea of unconscious predispositions of speech 
(ytbhildpa-vdsana), the commentary to the Mahayana-samgraha states that 
manifest cognitive awareness arises in regard to expressions of selves 
(atmari) and phenomena (dharma}, and so on, due to the special power 
(sakti-visesa} of the predispositions of conventional expressions 
(yyavahara}.121 That is to say, the conventional expressions of everyday 
speech (yyavahara}, which delineate the world into innumerable discrete 
objects and categories, subtly condition the way in which awareness of those
pravrtti-vijnanas] nurturing the seeds [B.I.], and [causing the alaya-vijnana] to grasp the 
seeds [of itself] [B.2.].”
126 The Pravrtti-Portion of the Yogacarabhumi, 4.b) A.l.(a). (D.5a7f; P.6a5f; T. 58Ob29f, 
1019c6f). This unconscious self-conception accompanies all states of mind: 4.b) B.4. “The 
mind which was explained above always arises and functions simultaneously with the alaya- 
vijnana. One should know that until it is completely destroyed it is always associated with the 
four afflictions (klesa, following Ch.) which by nature arise innately (sahaja) and simultane­
ously: a view of self-existence (satkaya-drsti), the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimana), self-love 
(atmasneha), and ignorance (avidya).” See Schmithausen 1987, p. 444, ns. 944f.
127 atZMSg 1.58. U 397a24-b4; u 266b4-267al; Bh. 336c5f; bh. 168b7f. 
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objects arises. The kinds of cognitive experiences people have, the cate­
gories of ‘things’ we see and touch, are indelibly influenced by the expres­
sions and figures of speech to which we are habituated.
The most influential of these unconscious predispositions of speech is 
undoubtedly the view of self (atma-drsti), which accompanies all cognitive 
processes, continuously distinguishing self and other.128 But, the 
Yogacarabhumi warns, as long as one “is not freed from the bondage of per­
ception in regard to phenomena (nzmzYto),” then so long will all our forms of 
cognitive awareness be influenced by these afflictive dispositions toward the 
sense “I am,”129 colored by the discriminations between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ 
And insofar as these instigate karmically consequential actions, this in­
grained self-view—virtual or not, unconscious or otherwise—will continu­
ously perpetuate the cycle of samsaric existence, keeping us ensnared in the 
vicious cycle of dependent arising.
128 Ibid. Bh. 336c9f; bh 169a2: gang gis bdag zhes bya ba dang / bzhan zhes bya ba’i bye 
brag 'dir 'gyur par byed do.
129 Pravrtti-Portion, 4.b) A.2. (D. 5b4-6; T. 580c9—13).
130 See Deacon 1997, p. 453: “These abstract representations have physical efficacy. They 
can and do change the world. They are as real and concrete as the force of gravity or the 
impact of a projectile.”
131 Ibid., p. 454 ; emphasis added.
The symbolic self, in other words, although generated out of the vortex of 
the linguistic recursivity underlying all cognitive processes, from the uncon­
scious level up, has compelling causal efficacy in its own right.130 And this 
is true both within a single lifetime, that is, ontogenetically, as well as in the 
traditional Buddhist conception of multiple lifetimes, that is, (after a fashion) 
phylogenetically. In more modem terms, Deacon intimates the powerful 
punch this symbolic self effectively delivers:
As symbolic reference and symbolic minds co-evolved from the 
non-symbolic ... so do the levels of self-representation that con­
stitute our experience bring themselves into being in a moment- 
by-moment coevolutionary process. As the symbolic process can 
be the co-author of our unanticipated brains, so can the symbolic 
self be the co-author of the component neural processes that sup­
port it. We live in a world that is both entirely physical and virtual 
at the same time.131
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VIII. The Cognitive Unconscious as Generative Matrix
of our ‘Common World’
We live our lives in this shared virtual world ... The doorway into this virtual world 
was opened to us alone by the evolution of language.
—Terrence William Deacon, The Symbolic Species
We now reach the last leg of our inquiry into the arising of the world of expe­
rience bereft of any external agents or internal subjects. Why, we must ask, 
if the ‘world’ co-arises with our cognitive systems, do we seem to live in so 
much the same world? How is it that we collectively ‘bring forth’ our shared 
world of human experience?
The short answer is, again, language; or rather, the common influences 
that language imparts on the activities, the karma, of human beings which, in 
turn, bring about common results. We live in this ‘shared virtual world,’ as 
Deacon puts it, in large part because “the evolution of symbolic communi­
cation . . . created a mode of extrabiological inheritance . . . [that] is intrinsi­
cally social,” one that evolved “neither inside nor outside brains, but at the 
interface where cultural evolutionary processes affect biological evolution­
ary’ processes”132 That is, we have similar kinds of cognitive processes 
because they developed historically through continuous interaction between 
human beings, giving rise to our common bodily forms with our species­
specific propensities toward cultural and social conditioning, and the 
dominating influences of linguistic classification, conceptualization, nomi- 
nalization, and so forth, through which we collectively yet unconsciously 
bring forth a shared world of experience.
132 Deacon 1997, p. 409f.
With allowances for the issue of rebirth, this is largely compatible with 
mainstream views of causality in the Yogacara tradition. Indeed, in one 
sense, this merely articulates the social, cultural and biological dimensions 
already implicit in the theory of dependent arising. But it took some one 
thousand years after the time of the Buddha for these implications to become 
explicit within Indian Buddhist thought. Again, it is the Mahayana- 
samgraha (MSg) of Asanga which explicitly articulates the connections 
between the social nature of language, its common influences upon human 
behavior, and the similarities of ‘worlds’ which result therefrom.
MSg 1.60 states that the subliminal form of cognitive awareness (alaya- 
vijnana) which subliminally ‘brings forth a world’ based upon the predis­
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positions to categorization, etc., exhibits both shared or common and uncom­
mon aspects:
The common [characteristic of the alaya-vijnana] is the seed of the 
receptacle world (bhajana-loka). The uncommon [characteristic of 
the alaya-vijnana] is the seed of the individual sense-spheres 
(pratyatmikayatana).
In most Indian Buddhist traditions, indeed in ancient India in general, this 
‘receptacle’ world in which we all dwell arises from the accumulated actions 
(karma) of numberless sentient beings.133 Asanga elaborates on this, stating 
that it is the common and uncommon actions of sentient beings that create the 
inanimate (bhajana-loka) and animate worlds (sattva-loka) respectively,134 
while the commentary to the MSg comments that without this shared aspect 
of subliminal cognitive awareness (a/czya-vi/nana), there could be no recep­
tacle world which is the basis for the shared usage of animate beings.135 At 
first blush, this may seem rather farfetched, but it is well in accord with the 
terms of our earlier analyses. Moreover, the sense that the similar cognitive 
domains of sentient beings ‘bring forth’ a common world was already deeply 
implicit in the Buddhist notion of karma. It is the common influences of lan­
guage that hold these all together.
133 AKBh. ad. IV l.a. (Shastri, p. 567; Poussin, tome 3, p. 1: sattvanam karmajam lokavai- 
citryam). Also ad II 56b, 57b. For the early Vedic sense of loka as a multidimensional ‘world’ 
constructed by human action, particularly ritual action, see Collins 1982, pp. 43-45.
134 The term sadharana here means “having or resting on the same support or basis” (SED, 
p. 1202).
135 Bh 337a28ff; bh 169b5. See also the Pravrtti-Portion of the Yogacarabhumi, I.5.b) 
A. 1-3, where the alaya-vijnana is considered the root of the inanimate and animate worlds 
coming into existence.
136 ad MSg 1.60, U 397cl2f; u 267a8-268al.
The commentary to this text explains:
[The statement:] ‘The common [characteristic of the alaya- 
vijnana] is the seed of the receptacle world’ means that it is the 
cause (karana-hetu) of perceptions (yijhapti) which appear as the 
receptacle world. It is common because these perceptions appear 
similarly to all who experience them through the force of ma­
turation (vipaka) that is in accordance with their own similar 
karma.136
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Simply put, our ‘world’137 appears to us in similar ways because we have 
similar karma to experience it similarly. But to what extent do our actions 
make this ‘experienced world’ similar? And how or why do we come to have 
similar karma?
137 Johansson (1979, p. 28f) has collected numerous passages that equate ‘the world’ (loka) 
with the ‘world of experience’: SN 169: “the world has arisen through the six (senses, or 
sense-modalities), it gives rise to knowledge (i.e., is known) through the six; building on the 
six, the world is destroyed in the six;” A II 48: “In this very fathom-long body, with its per­
ception and inner sense, I proclaim the world to be, likewise the origin of the world and the 
destruction of the world, likewise the method leading to the destruction of the world;” A IV 
430: “These five love-objects (kamaguna) are called the world in the code of the noble one. 
What five? Forms, cognized by the eye, longed for, alluring, pleasurable, lovely, bound up 
with passion and desire, sounds . . . , smells . . . , tastes . . . , contacts;” S I 39: “The world is 
brought up by the mind, swept away by the mind;” A II 49: “there is no release from suffer­
ing without reaching the end of the world.”
138 That the arising of consciousness, and the train of responses that follow, occur in dis­
cernible patterns is the gist of the series of dependent arising in general, as well as of many of 
the specific factors in particular.
In general, this simply unpacks part of what karma means in the classical 
Indian world-view: similar actions lead to similar results. All members of the 
same species are bom into similar kinds of bodies which are largely brought 
about by past karma, by the structural transformations incurred from innu­
merable past actions. Since our bodies are similar, the actions, the karma 
they resulted from, are also similar. And since these similar bodies have sim­
ilar cognitive structures, which both facilitate and circumscribe what we can 
normally see, feel and think, they ‘bring forth’ a common cognitive domain, 
a human ‘world’ that is distinguished, for example, from that of cats, bats or 
gnats. In other words, our common ‘world’ is produced by our common 
causal history, embodied in the similar structures and processes of our cog­
nitive capacities. As the commentary states, “perceptions appear similarly to 
all who experience them . . . in accordance with their own similar karma.”
These species-specific cognitive structures include, quite prominently, an 
‘extra-biological inheritance’ that arose “neither inside nor outside brains, 
but at the interface where cultural evolutionary processes affect biological 
evolutionary processes,” i.e., language. It is language that provides the 
means whereby the ‘common aspects’ of the alaya-vijnana give rise to a 
‘common’ receptacle world. As a medium for sharing, conceiving and 
expressing experience, language provides the common focus for similar 
kinds of cognitive processes to arise, processes that tend to provoke similar 
responses138 which, in turn, typically give rise to similar results. That is,
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actions that are informed and instigated by similar conditions and similar 
intentions give rise, over the long term, to a similar world. And this is the 
similar world in which we are ‘ensnared.’
It is just because our cognitive structures are constituted by linguistic pre­
dispositions that cognitive awareness is always subject to language’s endless 
recursivity (prapahca). The ‘predispositions or impressions of speech’ 
(abhildpa-vdsana), which have the ‘special power’ (safar-vzsestz) to give rise 
to manifest cognitive awareness (vijnana) in regard to expressions of selves 
(atmari), dharmas, and actions, etc. are never fully “used up” (anupabhukta), 
MSg 1.61.2 explains, because “the seeds of the impressions of language give 
rise to conceptual proliferation since beginningless time,” without which, 
the text continues, “the new arising of the impressions of language would be 
impossible.” In other words, this linguistic recursivity is the generative 
matrix from which endlessly springs forth our symbolic world, one that vir­
tually supercedes the physical world we appear to inhabit.139
139 See note 89 above.
140 It is the “unbounded” nature of symbolic media, in Deacon’s terms, that “gives us the 
ability to share a virtual common mind.” (Deacon 1997, p. 427).
The reciprocal feedback processes that language invites thus operate at a 
variety of levels, not only synchronically—between the alaya-vijnana and 
supraliminal forms of cognitive awareness—but also diachronically, bet­
ween our previous linguistic experience and our present proclivities condi­
tioned by the ‘impressions’ of language. These operate both within a single 
lifetime, and, in traditional Buddhist terms, over multiple lifetimes. What the 
MSg is now describing is a third, unconscious yet thoroughly intersubjective 
feedback system, which, like the other two dimensions of circular causality, 
continuously proliferates and perpetuates samsaric existence, but, unlike 
them, bridges the individual and collective experience of the ‘world,’ con­
necting our similar karmic activities with the similar ‘worlds’ these activities 
bring about.140
Since the recursivity that symbolic communication facilitates is “intrinsi­
cally social,” and has evolved “neither inside nor outside brains,” then our 
commonality of worlds, dependent upon our common species-specific cog­
nitive structures, is ultimately inseparable from our commonality of cogni­
tive awareness, dependent upon our common linguistic, symbolic structures. 
That is, Deacon declares, since,
symbolic reference is at once a function of the whole web of infer­
ential relationships and of the whole network of users extended in
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space and time ... a person’s symbolic experience of conscious­
ness ... is not within the head . . . This [symbolic] self is indeed 
not bounded within a mind or body . . . [it] is intersubjective in the 
most thoroughgoing sense of the term.141
141 Deacon 1997, p. 452f.
142 Paden 1992, p. 7.
143 MSg 1.60.
These mostly indiscernible processes both reflect and reinforce the cultural, 
social, and cognitive worlds we inhabit, not just as individuals but even more 
importantly as social beings, since “language is a primary medium through 
which humans inhabit their world.”142 Indeed, languages are like habitats, 
because they give rise to the inexhaustibly proliferating processes (prapanca) 
of classification and conceptualization (yikalpd) through which we habitual­
ly, nearly unavoidably and mostly unknowingly engage, construct and per­
petuate the ‘world’ which simultaneously sustains and ensnares us. It is our 
unconscious habits of body, speech, and mind to which we are habituated 
that give rise, in the long term and in the aggregate, to the habitats we inhab­
it. And, this, we suggest, is as true for some twentieth-century evolutionary 
biologists and neuroscientists as it was for fifth-century Yogacarin Bud­
dhists.
It further suggests, we venture, that we all have a larger share in the com­
mon construction of our ‘world’ than we commonly realize. For if we are not 
actually trapped inside our heads, but are causally as well as cognitively 
intersubjective through and through, it matters a great deal which particular 
concepts, categories and classifications we produce, proclaim and protect. 
We can and must strive, that is, to collectively unravel the “common bonds” 
(sadharana-bandhana) that ensnare us, “difficult to cut (dusheya) and diffi­
cult to fully comprehend (cfysparyneyu)”143 though they may be. It would 
make a world of difference.
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